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I. INTRODUCTION
Minnesota criminal courts are venturing into the complex federal world of immigration law.1 The courts are doing this by granting post-conviction relief-vacating criminal convictions after allowing withdrawals of guilty pleas-to prevent the deportation of
non-citizens under federal law.2 These crimes either may be the basis for deportation or may bar relief from deportation. Non-citizen
criminals argue that their deportation under federal law is a manifest injustice resulting from their guilty pleas, either because they
were unaware that they could be deported or their counsel failed to
inform them, or misinformed them, at the time they entered their
plea that they could be deported. They also may argue that although they knew of possible deportation when they pled guilty,
deportation is, by itself, a manifest injustice resulting from their
guilty pleas. Yet another argument is that the federal immigration
laws have changed-to their detriment. After all, the argument
continues, United States citizens cannot be deported for their
criminal activities so neither should they. In essence, deportation
resulting from a conviction is an additional punishment for the
crime and, therefore, non-citizens receive harsher penalties than
United States citizens receive for the same crime. To prevent this
stricter punishment, non-citizens argue that they should have their
1. The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
("IIRAIRA") of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.), made major changes to the federal immigration
laws. One change pertinent here is that Congress changed the terms "excludable"
and "deportable" to "inadmissible" and "removable." Congress also merged exclusion and deportation proceedings, formerly different types of proceedings, into a
single removal proceeding. Nevertheless, for ease of reference for the reader who
is not an intimate to the world of federal immigration laws, I will use the terms
"inadmissible," "deportable" and "deportation" in this article. Also, in the immigration statutes, someone who is not a United States citizen or national is an
"alien." See Immigration and Nationality Act, § 101(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3)
(1994 & Supp. IV 1999) (originally enacted as Immigration and Nationality (Walter McCarran) Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 101 (a) (3), 66 Stat. 163). When
the term "alien" is used in immigration law, it is a legally defined term-not a lay
term used derogatorily. Nevertheless, because some people are offended by the
legal term "alien," I will strive to use the term "non-citizen" in this article when referring to people who are not United States citizens or nationals.
2. Minnesota courts are also providing post-conviction relief in the form of
reduced sentences, for example. While these other forms of post-conviction relief
raise the same concerns as vacations of convictions, this article focuses on the latter.
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criminal convictions vacated or, from the outset, be sentenced to
less imprisonment or convicted of lessor charges than United States
citizens.
On August 6, 1998, the Minnesota Supreme Court decided
three cases in which non-citizens sought post-conviction relief be3
cause of federal immigration consequences. The court denied
post-conviction relief to three criminals, each trying to vacate their
convictions to avoid deportation.4 Defendant Berkow pled guilty to
theft by swindle, discharge of a firearm and third-degree arson.'
Defendant Alanis pled guilty to second-degree possession of a controlled substance, unlawfully obtaining Aid to Families with Dependent Children, unlawfully obtaining food stamps, possession of
a small amount of marijuana, and driving after revocation of his
driver's license. 6 Defendant Barragan was convicted of
7 a fifthdegree sale of a controlled substance after pleading guilty.
Each defendant asked the criminal court to allow them to
withdraw their guilty pleas and vacate their criminal convictions.
3. See Alanis v. State, 583 N.W.2d 573, 575-76 (Minn. 1998); Barragan v.
State, 583 N.W.2d 571, 572-73 (Minn. 1998); Berkow v. State, 583 N.W.2d 562, 564
(Minn. 1998).
4. See Alanis, 583 N.W.2d at 579; Barragan,583 N.W.2d at 572-73; Berkow, 583
N.W.2d at 564.
5. See Berkow, 583 N.W.2d at 563.
6. See Alanis, 583 N.W.2d at 575.
7. See Barragan,583 N.W.2d at 571.
8. See Alanis, 583 N.W.2d at 575; Barragan,583 N.W.2d at 571; Berkow, 583
N.W.2d at 563. Minnesota law allows a criminal defendant, after sentencing, to
move the criminal court to allow them to withdraw their plea of guilty and have
the conviction vacated, if necessary to correct a manifest injustice. See MINN. R.
CRIM. P. 15.05. That rule provides in relevant part:
Subd. 1. To Correct Manifest Injustice. The court shall allow a defendant
to withdraw a plea of guilty upon a timely motion and proof to the satisfaction of the court that withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice. Such a motion is not barred solely because it is made after sentence. If a defendant is allowed to withdraw a plea after sentence, the
court shall set aside the judgment and the plea.
Subd. 2. Before Sentence. In its discretion the court may also allow the
defendant to withdraw a plea at any time before sentence if it is fair and
just to do so, giving due consideration to the reasons advanced by the defendant in support of the motion and any prejudice the granting of the
motion would cause the prosecution by reason of actions taken in reliance upon the defendant's plea.
Subd. 3. Withdrawal of Guilty Plea Without Asserting Innocence. The
defendant may move to withdraw a plea of guilty without an assertion of
not guilty of the charge to which the plea was entered.
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Mr. Berkow said he did not understand that if he pled guilty he
might become deportable from the United States. 9 He also said his
attorney never told him of possible immigration consequences. 0
Therefore, he claimed his plea was not intelligent and he was denied effective assistance of counsel." Mr. Alanis advanced several
reasons for his motion for post conviction relief. Two concerned
immigration: (1) he was not advised that by pleading guilty he became deportable; and (2) he had been deprived of effective assistance of counsel.12 Mr. Barragan argued that becoming deportable
is itself a manifest injustice. Moreover, Mr. Barragan claimed that
the prosecutor made
misrepresentations about the likelihood of
4
being deported.
The Minnesota Supreme Court ruled in these cases that there
was no "manifest injustice" warranting post-conviction relief under
the three different but related grounds. First, federal immigration
consequences of criminal convictions are collateral, not direct,
consequences of the convictions. 5 Therefore, guilty pleas made in
ignorance of possible federal immigration consequences are still
knowing, voluntary and intelligent. 6 Second, because federal immigration consequences are collateral to a conviction, a criminal
defense attorney does not have a duty to inform the defendant of
federal immigration law.' 7 Because there is no duty, there is no ineffective assistance of counsel in the absence of this advice. Third,
the Minnesota Supreme Court held that deportation is not a manifest injustice warranting post-conviction relief in a state criminal
proceeding. 9
Despite the three Minnesota Supreme Court decisions, these
issues are not moot. Since these three decisions, Minnesota district
MINN. R. CRiM. P. 15.05.
9. See Berkow, 583 N.W.2d at 563.
10. See id.
11. See id.
12. See Alanis, 583 N.W.2d at 575.
13. See Barragan,583 N.W.2d at 572.
14. See id.
15. See Alanis, 583 N.W.2d at 578; Berkow, 583 N.W.2d at 563-64. Criminal
convictions may result in many collateral, yet negative, consequences and may affect current and future employment, credit, and public benefits, to name just a
few.
16. See Alanis, 583 N.W.2d at 578.
17. See id.
at 579; Berkow,583 N.W.2d at 564.
18. See Alanis, 583 N.W.2d at 579; Berkow,583 N.W.2d at 564.
19. See Alanis, 583 N.W.2d at 579; Barragan,583 N.W.2d at 572-73; Berkow, 583
N.W.2d at 564.
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courts have continued to allow non-citizens to withdraw their guilty
pleas and vacate criminal convictions solely because the criminal
may face deportation from the United States. Also, the Minnesota
Rules of Criminal Procedure have been amended to require that,
before accepting a plea of guilty, the court must question defendants to ensure that they understand that a conviction may have
immigration consequences."
As sympathetic as an individual case may be of a non-citizen
wanting to remain in the United States (especially if the non-citizen
alleges dire consequences should they leave the United States
and/or return to their country of citizenship), at least four significant problems arise with decisions by a state granting postconviction relief for these reasons. First, these decisions are unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause of the United States
Constitution.2 Minnesota courts exceed their proper authority by
venturing into these federal decisions. The state judge is deciding
that a non-citizen should remain in the United States. This is an
immigration determination. Immigration determinations are exclusively federal decisions. A complex federal system and detailed
federal law govern these decisions. State criminal courts do not
abide by these federal laws. The federal government is not represented in these state criminal proceedings and is not able to crossexamine the defendant, test their credibility or present evidence to
the criminal court. While a state court is concerned only about the
fate of the defendant before it, the United States is concerned
about uniform immigration treatment of all non-citizens. 23
20. In fact, despite the ruling from the Minnesota Supreme Court, Mr. Barragan, one month later, got his conviction vacated because he may be deported. See
Transcript of Motion Hearing at 24, State v. Barragan, No. K8-96-861 (Minn. Dist.
Ct., 7thJud. Dist., Sept. 14, 1998). He cited no new law or statute, and presented
no new reason. See id. at 23. He told the court he was there under equity, not law.
See id. at 3. The sole reason for his motion was to avoid the federal immigration
laws. See id. at 3-5. This time, however, after the Minnesota Supreme Court ruled
that Barragan is not entitled to post-conviction relief because he may be deported
under federal law, the court granted Mr. Barragan's motion. See id. at 24. Mr.
Barragan withdrew his guilty plea and his criminal conviction was vacated. See id.
at 23. The State of Minnesota amended the original complaint and charged Mr.
Barragan with possession of less than 30 grams of marijuana. See id. at 20. Mr.
Barragan pled guilty to this charge. See id. at 19. This conviction, by itself, does
not subject Mr. Barragan to deportation under federal law. See id. at 23.

21. See MINN. R. CRiM. P. 15.01 (effective for all criminal actions commenced
or arrests made after 12:00 a.m. onJanuary 1, 1999).
22. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
23. Unfortunately, the State of Minnesota does not have statistics available on
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1999
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Second, by granting this benefit to non-citizens and not to citizens, Minnesota courts are violating the equal protection of United
States citizens who cannot vacate their convictions for these reasons. States do not have a legitimate interest in distinguishing between citizens and non-citizens to make immigration determinations, let alone a substantial or compelling interest. Therefore,
these citizenship distinctions violate the Equal Protection Clause of
the United States Constitution.4 Third, these decisions appear to
disregard Minnesota Supreme Court precedent. Fourth, these decisions are inconsistent with stated Minnesota policies of achieving
uniform sentencing for criminals-sentencing that does not unfairly discriminate.
Minnesota criminal justice should operate without regard to a
criminal's citizenship status. This is legally correct and fundamentally fair. Those who disagree with federal law have the opportunity
to change it through their duly elected federal representatives.
They should not disregard federal and state law and contort state
criminal laws at the expense of fair treatment of U.S. citizens to
achieve what they believe to be the fair result in federal immigration matters.
Ultimately, regardless of whether a state vacates a conviction to
allow a non-citizen to escape deportation, the federal government
should not recognize this state action. This state action is an unconstitutional exercise of federal authority and is preempted by
the citizenship status of criminals from arrest to incarceration. However, in 1991,
the U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Criminal Offenders
Statistics reported that approximately four percent of State prison inmates were
not United States citizens. See U.S. Department ofJustice, Bureau of justice Statistics, Criminal Offender Statistics (visited Nov. 8, 1999) <http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/
bjs/crimoff.htm#fed>. In fiscal year 1996, 27.3% of federal criminal defendants
were not United States citizens.
See U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, 1996
SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS, CITIZENSHIP STATUS OF DEFENDANT

BY PRIMARY OFFENSE CATEGORY tbl. 9 (Oct. 1, 1995 through Sept. 30, 1996) (1996).
The current percentage of non-citizen federal prisoners is approximately 28.0%.
See United States Bureau of Prisons (visited Nov. 8, 1999) <http:\\www.bop.gov>. This
percentage has remained fairly steady during the last few years: 24.2% in 1990;
24.7% in 1991; 24.9% in 1992; 25.0% in 1993; 24.7% in 1994; and 25.4% in 1995.
See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS SOURCEBOOK OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS - 1995 tbl. 6.39 (1995). The Immigration and Naturalization Service removed, or deported, approximately 51,231 non-citizens with
criminal records in fiscal year 1997 and approximately 55,211 non-citizens with
criminal records in fiscal year 1998. The criminal records may or may not have
been the basis for removal. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE-INS, OFFICE OF
POLICYAND PLANNING, MONTHLY REMOVALS FY 1998 YEAR END REPORT (1998).

24.

See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1.
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federal law, making the citizenship distinctions in Minnesota
criminal courts even less supportable and understandable.
To understand these issues, we need to understand federal
immigration authority-what it is, how it is implemented, and how
it has dealt with criminal behavior-as well as the Supremacy and
Equal Protection Clauses. Many people outside the world of federal immigration law have only a general, vague understanding of
this authority and how it is implemented. We also will examine the
historic interplay of federal immigration and state criminal law and
the evolution of the interplay. Finally, we can then determine the
appropriateness of the Minnesota criminal justice system making
decisions based upon a criminal's citizenship.
II. FEDERAL IMMIGRATION AUTHORITY AND STRUCTURE
The federal government has exclusive and paramount control
over immigration issues. "[T]he power to expel or exclude aliens
[is] a fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the Government's political departments largely immune from judicial control."2 - "When the national government by treaty or statute has established rules and regulations touching the rights, privileges,
obligations or burdens of aliens as such, the treaty or statute is the
supreme law of the land. 26 The "[p]ower to regulate
immigration
27
is unquestionably exclusively a federal power.
Within the federal government, the Attorney General has primary responsibility for enforcing immigration laws.28 She does so
through three main, separate components within the Department
ofJustice: (1) the Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS"),
which adjudicates benefits and applications for various immigrant
and non-immigrant status and naturalization, investigates fraud, arrests those who are in violation of the immigration laws and admin-

25. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (citing Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345
U.S. 206, 210 (1953)).
26. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 62-63 (1941).
27. De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 354 (1976).
28. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 103, 8 U.S.C. § 1103 (1994 & Supp.
IV 1999). The Attorney General does not, however, have an exclusive role. The
United States Department of State, the President, the Department of Labor, and
the Department of Health and Human Services each have a role in implementing
and/or enforcing immigration laws. See Immigration and Nationality Act §§ 103,
104, 204; see also, e.g., 8 C.F.R. pts. 204, 274A; 22 C.F.R. et seq.; 29 C.F.R. et seq,: 42
C.F.R. et seq.
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istratively prosecutes and removes illegal non-citizens; (2) the Executive Office for Immigration Review ("EOIR"), which, through
independent administrative judges and an administrative appellate
tribunal, decides and reviews cases prosecuted by the INS of people
applying for admission to the United States who appear inadmissible and those who have been admitted and are later accused of being in the United States in violation of law;3° and (3) the Office of
Chief Administrative Hearing Office ("OCAHO"), which, through
administrative law judges, decides cases involving the employment
verification, civil document fraud and employment discrimination
cases brought by the INS and the Office of Special Counsel. 31 Also,
the United States attorneys prosecute criminal immigration violations in federal district court brought by the INS. 2
With few exceptions, the INS does not have the authority to
order someone deported from the United States.39 Rather, the INS

29. See8 C.F.R. pts. 2,100, 103, 287 (1999), 28 C.F.R. §§ 0.105-0.110 (1998).
30. See 8 C.F.R. pt. 3 (1999); 28 C.F.R. §§ 0.115-0.118 (1998).
31. See generally Immigration and Nationality Act §§ 274A, 274B & 274C; see
also 28 C.F.R. §§ 0.115, 0.118 (1998).
32. See 28 C.F.R. § 0.55(f) (1998).
33. The Immigration and Naturalization Service may remove an alien applying for admission to the United States without referring the case to an immigration judge in limited circumstances. This is commonly referred to as "expedited
removal." These are cases of people without valid entry documents or who have
made material misrepresentations of fact in order to get an immigration benefit,
who are not lawful permanent residents and who do not possess a credible fear of
returning to their country. Non-citizens who are found to possess a credible fear
of returning may apply for asylum and withholding of removal before an immigration judge. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 235; 8 U.S.C. § 1225 (1994 &
Supp. IV 1998). Also, people entering, or who have entered, the United States
under the Visa Waiver Pilot Program have waived their right to an immigration
judge hearing as part of participating in the program, which does not require a
visa. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 217, 8 U.S.C. § 1187 (1994 & Supp. IV
1999). Once again, however, non-citizens may nevertheless apply for asylum and
withholding of removal before an immigration judge. There is another limited
exception to a removal hearing before an immigration judge in the case of a person who is not a lawful permanent resident alien who is convicted of an "aggravated felony." See Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a) (43), 8 U.S.C. §
I101(a) (43) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999). The Immigration and Naturalization Service may issue an order of removal without referring the case to an immigration
judge. See id. Finally, although this is not necessarily considered a new order of
removal, the Immigration and Naturalization Service may deport a non-citizen
who illegally enters the U.S. after having been previously deported without referring the case to another hearing before an immigration judge. This is commonly
referred to as "reinstatement" of removal-the previous order is reinstated by statute. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 241 (a) (5), 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (a) (5) (1994
& Supp. IV 1999).
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initiates a civil, administrative hearing before an immigration
judge.3 The immigration judge has authority to enter an order of
deportation. 5 These hearings involve many statutory and regulatory rights for the non-citizens. For instance, they have the right to
be represented by counsel at no expense to the government, the
right to present evidence and witnesses and to cross-examine witnesses presented by the government.m If needed, the hearings are
translated into a language that the respondent understands. 7
Every removal hearing contains essentially two parts. The first
concerns whether a person is inadmissible to or deportable from
the United States. If a person applies for admission to the United
States and an immigration judge determines that the person is admissible to the United States, the immigration judge grants admission. Likewise, if a person has previously been admitted to the
United States and an immigration judge determines that the person is not deportable from the United States, the immigration
judge terminates the removal proceedings." On the other hand, if
the immigration judge determines that a person is not admissible
to the United States or is deportable from the United States, the
34. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 239, 8 U.S.C. § 1229 (1994 & Supp.
IV 1999); see also 8 C.F.R. pt. 239 (1999).
35. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 240, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (1994 &
Supp. IV 1999); see also 8 C.F.R. §§ 1.1(1), 3.9, 3.10, pt. 240 (1999). There are
some instances in which a non-citizen can be refused admission to the United
States, or deported from the U.S., without a hearing before ajudge. See 28 C.F.R.
§§ 0.5, 0.55(f) (1998). These fall under the provisions for expedited removal
(Immigration and Nationality Act § 235, 8 U.S.C. § 1225 (1994 & Supp. IV 1999))
and reinstatement of previously entered deportation orders when a person subsequently reenters the United States illegally (Immigration and Nationality Act
§241 (a) (5), 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (a) (5) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999)). Also a United States
district court may order a non-citizen deported as part of the criminal proceedings
at the time of sentencing if requested by the United States Attorney and only upon
the concurrence of the Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Service. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 238(c) (1), 8 U.S.C. § 1228(c) (1) (1994
& Supp. IV 1999). In fact, an Assistant United States Attorney has no authority to
agree not to deport a non-citizen, absent express concurrence by the Immigration
and Naturalization Service. See 28 C.F.R. § 0.197 (1998). Finally, there are rarely
used, but separate procedures for removal hearings in the case of terrorists. See
Immigration and Nationality Act tit. V, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1537 (1994 & Supp. IV
1999).
36. See Immigration and Nationality Act §§ 240(b) (4) (B), 292; 8 U.S.C. §§
1229a(b) (4) (B), 1362. The statutory rights of non-citizens are fewer under Immigration and Nationality Act tit. V, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1537 (1994 & Supp. IV 1999),
which provides for special hearings for terrorists.
37. See8 C.F.R. § 3.22 (1999).
38. See8 C.F.R. § 240.12(c) (1999).
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second part of the hearing begins. In this second part, a noncitizen may apply for relief (as it is commonly termed), which allows them to avoid deportation.3 9 This relief, contained in federal
statutory provisions, waives certain grounds of inadmissibility or
deportability, allowing a non-citizen to enter or remain as an immigrant or non-immigrant.4 Each form of relief has its own require39. Also, in the case of a non-citizen arriving in the United States applying for
admission, the immigration judge may allow the non-citizen to withdraw their application for admission and leave the United States. See 8 C.F.R. § 240.1(d)
(1999).
40. The waivers/exceptions for admission include Immigration and NationalityAct §§ 212(a) (2) (A) (ii) (8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (2) (A) (ii) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999));
212(a)(6)(A)(ii) (8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(ii)); 212(a)(6)(E)(ii) (8 U.S.C. §
1182(a)(6)(E)(ii); 212(a)(9)(B)(v) (8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v)); § 212(d) (8
U.S.C. § 1182(d)); 212(g)-(i) (8 U.S.C. § 1182(g)-(i)), and 212(k)-(1) (8 U.S.C. §
1182(k)-(l)). The waivers for deportation include Immigration and Nationality
Act §§ 237(a)(1)(D)(ii) (8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(D)(ii) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999));
237(a)(1)(E) (ii)-(iii) (8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (1) (E) (ii)-(iii)); 237(a) (1) (H) (8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(1)(H)); 237(a)(2)(A)(v) (8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(v)); 237(a)(3)
(C)(ii) (8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(3)(C)(ii)), and 237(c) (8 U.S.C. § 1227(c)). Other
forms of relief include: adjustment of status (Immigration and Nationality Act §
245, 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (1994 & Supp. IV 1999)); cancellation of removal (Immigration and Nationality Act § 240A, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b (1994 & Supp. IV 1999)); voluntary departure (Immigration and Nationality Act § 240B, 8 U.S.C. § 1229c (1994 &
Supp. IV 1999)); asylum (Immigration and Nationality Act § 208 (8 U.S.C § 1158
(1994 & Supp. IV 1999)); withholding of removal (Immigration and Nationality
Act § 241 (b) (3), (8 U.S.C. § 1231(b) (3) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999) (not discretionary)); and registry (Immigration and Nationality Act § 249, 8 U.S.C. § 1259 (1994
& Supp. IV 1999)).
Additionally, the Immigration and Naturalization Service may "parole"
someone into the United States. This authority allows a person, under limited circumstances, to be in the United States without having been "admitted." See Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(d) (5), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d) (5) (1994 & Supp. IV
1999). It is used in cases of urgent humanitarian reasons or for significant public
benefit in a case by case basis. See id. In addition to all of these types of relief codified in the Immigration and Nationality Act as amended, Congress may pass private bills for the benefit of an individual, and special types of legislation benefiting
certain nationality groups.
Finally, a non-citizen may apply for relief under the Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
adopted and opened for signature Dec. 10, 1984, G.A. res. 39/46, Annex, 39 U.N.
GAOR Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1984) (entered into force June
26, 1987; for the United States Apr. 18, 1988). This convention prohibits the returning of people to a country in which there are substantial grounds for believing
that they would be in danger of being tortured by a government or public official.
See id. Unlike asylum and withholding of removal, the fear or danger need not be
on account of race, nationality, religion, political opinion, or membership in a
particular social group. See id. However, legitimate punishment that is proportionate to criminal activity is not within the terms of protection under this convention.
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ments, and almost all relief is discretionary.
Both the non-citizen and the INS may appeal a decision by an
immigration judge to the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA").41
If the non-citizen does not like the decision of the BIA, the noncitizen can, in limited circumstances, seek judicial review of certain
decisions in the appropriate federal circuit court of appeals.4 2

If

the INS does not like the decision of the BIA, the INS Commissioner may request that the U.S. Attorney General review the decision.43
Moreover, even though a person may be subject to a final order of deportation, they may apply for a stay of their deportation
from the INS. 4 They also may seek protection under Temporary
Protected Status.' Temporary Protected Status allows a stay of deportation for nationals of designated countries during designated
periods of armed conflict; earthquake, flood, drought, epidemics
or other environmental disasters; when the foreign country is unable to handle the return of their citizens; or when extraordinary
and temporary conditions prevent the safe return of foreign nationals to their countries. 46 Non-citizens also may request that Con47
gress pass a private bill granting relief to an individual non-citizen.
In the harsh realities of our world political climate, the United
States may not be able to execute orders of deportation to coun-

41. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 3.1(b), 3.38 (1999). An exception exists when a person
fails to appear for their hearing and the hearing is conducted in absentia. No appeal lies from an in absentia order of removal, although the proceeding can be
reopened in limited circumstances. See Immigration and Nationality Act §
240(a)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1230(a)(5) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999); 8 C.F.R. §
3.23(b) (4) (ii)-(iii) (1999).
42. Formerly, virtually all decisions of the BIA were reviewable in federal
courts. In 1996, however, frustrated by lengthy and time-consuming litigation in
federal court, coupled with limited judicial resources, Congress restricted judicial
review of many administrative immigration decisions. Now, most discretionary decisions of the Attorney General to grant relief are not reviewable. (Asylum decisions remain subject to judicial review.) See Immigration and Nationality Act §
242(a) (2) (B), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) (2) (B) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999). Also, Congress
precluded review of orders of removal for criminal aliens. See Immigration and
Nationality Act § 242(a) (2) (C), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) (2) (C) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999).
43. See8 C.F.R. § 3.1(h)(1)(iii) (1999).
44. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 241 (c) (2), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c) (2)
(1994 & Supp. IV 1999); see also 8 C.F.R. § 241.6 (1999).
45. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 244, 8 U.S.C. § 1254 (1994 & Supp.
TV 1999).
46. See id.
47.

See CHARLEs GORDON ET AL., IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 74.09

(Matthew Bender ed., 1998).
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tries without operational governments, with which we do not have
diplomatic relations or which are not accepting return of their citi48
zens.
The entirety of federal immigration law enforcement, from
how the executive branch structures its immigration enforcement
to who qualifies for relief and the forms of relief available, is implemented in detail in accordance with federal law.
III. STATE ACTIONS BASED UPON CITIZENSHIP OR REGULATING
IMMIGRATION

We begin again with the fundamental legal principal that the
federal government has exclusive authority to regulate immigration. By this authority, the federal government routinely distinguishes between citizens and non-citizens. States, however, have
only limited authority to make such distinctions. In the words of
the United States Supreme Court:
Although it is "a routine and normally legitimate part" of
the business of the Federal Government to classify on the
basis of alien status.... and to "take into account the
character of the relationship between the alien and this
country"... only rarely are such matters relevant to legislation by a State.... States do have some authority to act
with respect to illegal aliens, at least where such action
federal objectives and furthers a legitimate state
mirrors
49
goal.

State action is impermissible when it does not mirror federal
objectives, but stands, "as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress."5° Over
the years, states have enacted various laws impacting non-citizens.
48. See Immigration and Naturalization Service Operations Instruction 243.3.
Cuba, for example, is the most well-known. Additionally, federal statutes and
regulations govern whether and when a person may be held in custody pending
their deportation after a deportation order becomes final. Generally speaking, if
the federal government cannot execute an order of deportation within a statutory
period of time, the non-citizen may usually be released from custody in accordance with regulation. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 241 (a) (3), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1231 (a) (3) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999). See also Immigration and Nationality Act §
241(a)(6), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999); 8 C.F.R. §§ 241.4 &
241.5 (1999).
49. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 225 (1982).
50. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941) (citations omitted).
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The validity of each law has depended on its nature and the constitutional provisions it may offend. State regulation invokes primarily two constitutional concerns: (1) the Supremacy Clause" and
naturalization power, which vest the federal government with primary and
supreme authority to regulate immigration and naturalization; 2 and (2) the Equal Protection Clause. 5' In simple terms,
state action must clear two primary federal hurdles. First, it must
not intrude into the federal government's authority to regulate
immigration. If it does, then it is unconstitutional. If it does not,
then the state action must not violate the Equal Protection Clause.
A.

Supremacy Clause

Not every state law, "which in any way deals with aliens is a
regulation of immigration and thus per se preempted by this constitutional power, whether latent or exercised."4 Regulation of immigration is "essentially a determination of who should or should
not be admitted into the country, and the conditions under which
a legal entrant may remain. "55 "Under the Constitution the states
are granted no such powers; they can neither add to nor take from the
conditions lawfully imposed by Congress upon admission, naturalization
56
and residence of aliens in the United States or the several states."
State law may violate the Supremacy Clause in three ways: (1)
if it regulates a particular field that is exclusively within the authority of the federal government to regulate; 7 (2) if the regulation is
not exclusively within the federal government's authority to regulate, then the nature of the subject matter permits no other conclusion than that it is within the federal authority or Congress has or51. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
52. The U.S. Constitution does not explicitly address the authority to regulate
immigration. Throughout the years, the source of this authority has been attributed to: (1) the constitutional provision granting Congress the power to establish a
uniform rule of naturalization; (2) the Commerce Clause; (3) the plenary authority over foreign relations; and (4) an inherent power which all sovereign nations
have to regulate its borders. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 225; see also Toll v. Moreno, 458
U.S. 1, 10-11 (1982).
53. See U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
54. De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 355 (1976).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 358 n.6 (emphasis in original); see also Toll, 458 U.S. at 12-13 ("State
regulation not congressionally sanctioned.., that discriminates against aliens lawfully admitted to the country is impermissible if it imposes additional burdens not
contemplated by Congress.") (citations omitted).
57. SeeDe Canas, 424 U.S. at 354, 356.
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that the federal government alone has regulatory author(3) the state law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplish-

ment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.,59

Early in our history, state attempts to charge a passenger fee or
direct that non-citizens arriving from foreign ports post bonds to
ensure that they would not become a public charge, were held to
be unconstitutional regulations of commerce and immigration. 60
In fact, even state regulation appearing harmonious with federal
law may be unconstitutional if it stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment to the execution of the full purposes and objectives
of Congress.6'
For example, in 1971, California enacted an employment law
to protect authorized workers. 6' This law prohibited employers,
when authorized workers would be adversely affected, from knowingly hiring non-citizens who were not entitled to lawful residence
in the United States. 63 In this immigration-related context, the
United States Supreme Court set forth their three-part preemption
test in De Canas v. Bica:M (1) whether the state regulates a particular
field which is exclusively within the authority of the federal government to regulate; (2) whether the nature of the subject matter
concerned by state regulation, while not exclusively within the federal government's authority to regulate, is of the nature which
permits no other conclusion than that it is within the federal
authority or Congress has ordained that the federal government
alone has regulatory authority; or (3) whether the state law stands
as an obstacle to the accomplishment to the execution of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress. 65
58. See id. at 357.
59. Id. at 363 (citations omitted); see also League of United Latin Am. Citizens
v. Wilson, 997 F. Supp. 1244, 1252-53 (C.D. Cal. 1997). The Wilson court applied
the De Canas analysis to California's Proposition 187 which, among other things,
restricted unauthorized non-citizens from receiving many state public benefits as
well as mandated certain reporting of unauthorized non-citizens to the INS. See id.
at 1249. The district court found that federal law preempted many of Proposition
187's provisions. See id. at 1261.
60. See Passenger Money Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849).
61. SeeDe Canas, 424 U.S. at 363 (citations omitted).
62. See id.
63. See id.
64. 424 U.S. 351 (1976).
65. See id. at 354, 356-57, 363. The Supreme Court could not decide all constitutional preemption issues based upon the record and remanded the case for
full consideration based upon their analysis. See id. at 364. It was unclear whether
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The Supreme Court recognized that regulation of immigration
is "essentially a determination of who should or should not be admitted into the country, and the conditions under which a legal enThey believed, in 1976, that, "[t]he
trant may remain."6 6
comprehensiveness of the INA scheme for regulation of immigration and naturalization, without more, cannot be said to draw in
the employment of illegal aliens as 'plainly within... [that] central
aim of federal regulation.' 67 Moreover, other federal statutes appeared to allow states to regulate the employment of aliens consistent with federal law."'
The Court then recognized that states have, "broad authority
under their police powers to regulate the employment relationship
to protect workers within the State." 69 The Court found that this
California law was enacted under proper police power for the express purpose of addressing local problems of job deprivation for
authorized workers, curtailing the substandard wages and working
conditions for all workers which result from employing nonauthorized workers and the diminished effectiveness of labor unions.70 However, the Supreme Court did not stop there. "[E]ven
state regulation designed to protect vital state interests must give
way to paramount federal legislation." 7' The Supreme Court then

the California law, as written or interpreted, would apply to non-citizens who were
authorized to work, though were illegally residing in the United States. See id. At
the time of this decision, which is much different than now, the Immigration and
Nationality Act did not regulate employment of aliens. Since then, Congress has
amended the Immigration and Nationality Act to regulate the employment of
non-citizens, discrimination in the employment process, and administrative
document fraud provisions. See Immigration and Nationality Act §§ 274A-274C, 8
U.S.C. § 1324(a)-(c) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999). At the time of the De Canas decision, however, the Court noted the comprehensiveness of the INA in dealing with
the entry and stay of aliens in the United States, but not their employment. SeeDe
Canas, 424 U.S. at 360-61. Also, there were other federal statutes that appeared to
give states authority to regulate as California did. See id. at 362. Nevertheless, the
Court was concerned that even state legislation which was a proper exercise of police power, and apparently harmonious with federal law, could nevertheless be unconstitutional because it may frustrate the purposes of Congress. See id. at 364.
Since the record on this issue needed to be developed, the Court remanded the
case. See id.
66. De Canas, 424 U.S. at 355.
67. Id. at 359 (emphasis added).
68. See id. at 362.
69. Id. at 356-57.
70. See id. at 357, 365.
71. Id. at 357.
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remanded the case for development of this issue.
Therefore, we learn from De Canas that state regulation of
immigration simply is impermissible. We also learn that even state
action not directly regulating immigration-action taken pursuant
to proper state police authority-may nevertheless be unconstitutional if it frustrates the full purposes and intent of Congress.
The issue of whether a state can vacate convictions for the
purpose of allowing non-citizens to avoid federal immigration laws
has not been brought before the United States Supreme Court.
Under United States Supreme Court analysis, however, it would be
unconstitutional. First, it is evident that such action is a direct
regulation of immigration. It is a state taking action to bar the application of federal immigration law to a non-citizen. It is a state
determination that a non-citizen, whom Congress has said should
be placed in federal immigration proceedings and subject to federal immigration laws, should remain in the United States and not
be placed in federal removal proceedings. As a direct regulation of
immigration, federal law preempts it.
Second, states have police powers to regulate criminal matters
within their jurisdiction. However, as the Court stated in De Canas,
even regulations which are meant to protect vital state interests
must give way to paramount federal legislation. 7 A state may say
that its interest in granting post-conviction relief to a non-citizen is
to ensure that its police power is exercised in a fair and just manner, so that the non-citizen will not be deported for a crime which
the court does not think merits deportation. After all, because of
the immigration consequences, a conviction and sentence may well
be much harsher for the non-citizen than for the citizen. If state
law and punishment is to be exercised fairly, then the state must
consider and act upon the potential immigration consequences.
Otherwise, the state will punish the non-citizen more harshly than
the citizen. However, Congress has clearly set forth which noncitizens will be placed in immigration proceedings, what criminal
behavior will subject the non-citizen to immigration proceedings,
what relief is available to that person and under what conditions
the non-citizen may remain in the United States. Therefore, this
purported state interest is in direct conflict with the full purposes
and intent of Congress and must fail. Federal law again preempts

72.
73.

See id. at 365.
See424 U.S. at 357.
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Furthermore, Congress has, in great detail, set forth procedures for hearings, decisions and review of these hearings and decisions in immigration matters.7 4 This involves representation by the
INS, submission and consideration of evidence and argument by
both the non-citizen and the federal government, and adherence
to federal immigration law. State criminal court hearings vacating
convictions for alleged immigration consequences involve no representation by the federal government. The United States does not
present evidence on the facts alleged by the defendant, has no opportunity to cross-examine the defendant, and has no review of
these decisions by the BIA or federal courts. Simply put, state
criminal courts do not adhere to any of the federal immigration
laws. These unaccountable immigration decisions clearly are preempted by federal law.
Congress has sole authority to regulate which aliens enter and
remain in the United States. Although states certainly can make
and enforce criminal laws, they cannot do so to regulate immigradon.
B.

Equal Protection

The Equal Protection Clause affords all persons in the United
States equal protection under the law.75 In the immigration context, this clause comes into play when states make distinctions
based upon citizenship. For instance, states have required that only
United States citizens can be licensed in certain professions or receive public assistance. Generally, these distinctions must meet the
heightened standard of being necessary to further a compelling
state interest, which has been difficult for states to establish.76
74. See Immigration and Nationality Act §§ 239, 240, 242; 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229,
1230, 1252 (1994 & Supp. IV 1999).
75. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; University of Cal. Regents v. Bakke, 438
U.S. 265 (1978).
76. See, e.g., In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 724-25 (1973) (holding state requirement that lawyers be U.S. citizens is unconstitutional); Examining Bd. of
Eng'rs, Architects and Surveyors v. Flores De Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 605-06 (1976)
(deciding U.S. citizenship requirement in Puerto Rico for engineers engaged in
private practice is unconstitutional); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 43 (1915) (concluding that state statute requiring employers with more than five employees to
employ at least 80% qualified electors or native born citizens is unconstitutional);
Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 225-26 (1984) (determining that states cannot restrict notary publics to U.S. citizens); Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 12 (1977)
(finding that state statute barring resident aliens from receiving state financial as-
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However, the United States Supreme Court has used a lower, intermediate standard when reviewing a state law prohibiting the use
of public funds to educate children who are not legally in the
United States."
Citizenship distinctions for public employment or office are
given more deference and are reviewed under the lessor, intermediate standard in what often is referred to as the "political function" exception.78 These distinctions are upheld if: (1) they are not
substantially overinclusive or underinclusive to serve legitimate political ends; and (2) they apply to those holding elective office or
important nonelective executive, legislative, and judicial positions
who "participate directly in the formulation, execution, or review of
broad public policy"7 9 and "perform functions that go to the heart

of representative government."80 For example, California's requirement that peace officers-or any governmental position having the powers of a peace officer-be United States citizens is constitutional. These positions are part of the "sovereign's power to
exercise coercive force over the individual"81' and "symbolize this
power of the political community over those who fall within its jurisdiction. 82 Also, states may require that public school teachers be
either United States citizens or lawful permanent residents who
83
have declared their intention to become United States citizens.
Public school teachers fulfill a basic governmental obligation of
educating youth and influencing them about the government, the
system. 84
political process and values necessary for our political
However, states may not bar non-citizens from competitive civil
service government positions that are not one of these essential
815
roles in the political functioning of the state. Likewise, a state may
sistance for higher education violates the Equal Protection Clause of the United
States Constitution); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 226 (1982) ("The State may borrow the federal classification.... But tojustify its use as a criterion for its own discriminatory policy, the State must demonstrate that the classification is reasonably
adapted to "the purposes for which the state desires to use it.") (citation omitted).
77. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 223. The Court did not review the state action under
the highest suspect classification review because undocumented non-citizens are
not a suspect class and public education is not a fundamental right. See id. at 223.
78. See Berna, 467 U.S. at 221.
79. Id. at 221-22 (quoting Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 647 (1973)).
80. Bernal,467 U.S. at 222.
81. Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432, 445 (1982).
82. Id. at 447.
83. See Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 80-81 (1979).
84. See id. at 78.
85. See Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 646-47 (1973).
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not require a loyalty oath in which all public employees, regardless
of type or nature of job, swear that they are citizens of the United
86
States and the state.
Regarding undocumented or illegal aliens, the United States
Supreme Court has stated that intermediate scrutiny is appropriate:
We reject the claim that "illegal aliens" are a "suspect
class." No case in which we have attempted to define a
suspect class... has addressed the status of persons unlawfully in our country. Unlike most of the classifications
that we have recognized as suspect, entry into this class, by
virtue of entry into this country, is the product of voluntary action. Indeed, entry into the class is itself a crime.
In addition, it could hardly be suggested that undocumented status is a "constitutional irrelevancy." With respect to the actions of the Federal Government, alienage
classifications may be intimately related to the conduct of
foreign policy, to the federal prerogative to control access
to the United States, and to the plenary federal power to
determine who has sufficiently manifested his allegiance
to become a citizen of the Nation. No State may independently exercise a like power. But if the Federal Government has by uniform rule prescribed what it believes to
be appropriate standards for the treatment of an alien
subclass, the States may, of course, follow the federal direction. See De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 96 S. Ct. 433,
47 L.Ed2d 43 (1976) .87
.... At the least, those who elect to enter our territory
by stealth and in violation of our law should be prepared
to bear the consequences, including, but not limited to,
Nor is undocumented status an absodeportation....
lutely immutable characteristic since it is the product of
conscious, indeed unlawful, action. 8
While virtually all state action examined by the United States
Supreme Court regarding immigration issues have "disadvantaged"
non-citizens or given preference to citizens, state action which gives
preferential treatment to non-citizens over citizens also would be

86. See City of Orlando v. Florida, 751 F. Supp. 974, 976 (M.D. Fla. 1990).
87. Plyler,457 U.S. at 219 n.19.
88. Id. at 220.
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subject to the Equal Protection Clause. 9 The Equal Protection
Clause is an individual and personal righe and is available regardless of the person's background. 9'
Under equal protection analysis, it becomes apparent that
states cannot treat criminal non-citizens more leniently than citizens without violating the Equal Protection Clause. First, we need
to consider the type of distinction made and the state's interest in
this distinction. 92 If the distinction involves a suspect classification
or a fundamental right, the state's interest must be compelling and
the distinction must be necessary and precisely tailored to further
this compelling interest. 93 If the distinction does not involve a suspect classification or a fundamental right, the citizenship or alienage classification must be rational and further a substantial state interest or be substantially related to an important government
objective.94
Courts have not yet squarely decided this issue. Therefore, we
do not know with a certainty at this time what type of equal protection scrutiny courts would apply to citizenship or alienage distinctions of criminal defendants. It appears, though, that the states
would need to demonstrate a compelling interest for providing a
benefit to a non-citizen which they deny to a citizen.
Regardless of which level of judicial equal protection scrutiny
applies, states simply do not have a lawful interest in preventing the
deportation of non-citizens, and this distinction fails under all levels of scrutiny. This is an immigration determination that is in the
exclusive domain of the federal government.
Again, a purported state interest in distinguishing between
criminal defendants because of their citizenship is to presumably
ensure the just and fair punishment for the offense. The rationale
of this interest continues with the statement that non-citizens, by
virtue of federal law, may be deported because of their crime
and/or the punishment imposed (the type and length of sentence). Therefore, the state punishment must be less (no convic89. See University of Cal. Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 289-90 (1978).
90. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948) (holding that state action
enforcing racially biased property covenants is invalid under the Fourteenth
Amendment). The Supreme Court also recognized judicial action as state action
within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id.
91. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 290-91.
92. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 223-24 (1982).
93. See id.
94. See id.
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tion, lighter sentence, or later vacating the conviction) to ensure
that the non-citizen is not treated more harshly than the citizen is
by a later deportation. Deportation may be harsher than the
criminal punishment and state criminal court judges may not believe that deportation is warranted as punishment for the conviction.
Fundamentally, this argument boils down to the state judge
deciding that a non-citizen should remain in the United States.
The state is disagreeing with the operation of federal immigration
laws and the distinctions that Congress has made in the terms and
conditions of a non-citizen's residence in this country. This is, fundamentally, not a legitimate or legal concern for a state. Therefore, this state interest is not, and cannot be, compelling or substantial.
Moreover, the collateral consequences of a conviction go far
beyond potential immigration consequences. Convictions may affect current and future employment, public benefits, credit, licensing, volunteer opportunities and more. 915 A prior conviction may
also determine how severely a person is punished when sentenced
for a future crime. 6 To grant amelioration of a criminal conviction
to a non-citizen and not to a citizen, based upon citizenship, disadvantages and penalizes United States citizens. United States citizens are not afforded equal protection of the laws.
IV. FEDERAL IMMIGRATION TREATMENT OF CRIMINALS
The first federal immigration law dealing specifically with
criminals was enacted on March 3, 1875. 97 This law prevented the
entry of "person [s] who are undergoing a sentence for conviction
in their own country of felonious crimes other than political or
growing out of or the result of such political offenses, or whose sentence has been remitted on condition of their emigration .... "9
Seven years later, Congress provided, "[t]hat all foreign convicts
except those convicted of political offenses, upon arrival, shall be
sent back to the nations to which they belong and from whence
they came."'O After these initial general statements of which crimi95.
See infra notes 218-232 and accompanying text (including a nonexhaustive list of collateral consequences of convictions in Minnesota).
96. See MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND COMMENTARY § II.B (1998)

97.
98.
99.

Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 141, 18 Stat. 477 (1875).
Id.
Act of Aug. 3, 1882, ch. 376, 22 Stat. 214 (1882).
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nals are inadmissible to the United States, Congress became more
specific in 1891 and added the concept of "crimes involving moral
turpitude,"100 beginning what now is a detailed listing of criminal
behavior in the immigration laws. Congress excluded, or made inadmissible, from the United States: "persons who have been convicted of a felony or other infamous crime or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude....""'
Since the late 1800s, immigration laws have greatly expanded.
In 1952, federal immigration laws were overhauled into the basic
Immigration and Nationality Act from which we have been operating since with amendments and changes. 02 Since 1952, steady and
100. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 551, 26 Star. 1084 (1891). Crimes involving moral
turpitude are, generally, crimes involving deceit and fraud; crimes which are inherently morally reprehensible and intrinsically wrong; crimes which are "inherently base, vile, or depraved, and contrary to the accepted rules of morality and
the duties owed between persons or to society in general." Matter of Franklin, 20 I.
& N. Dec. 867, 868 (BIA 1994) (citations omitted).
101. Act of Mar. 3,1891, ch. 551, 26 Stat. 1084 (1891).
102. Regarding criminal convictions, in 1952, a person was not allowed to enter the United States if.
(1) they had been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude (with
the exception of someone who only committed one crime while under 18
"and more than 5 years has elapsed since commission of the crime or release from prison");
(2) they had been convicted of two or more offenses (other than purely
political offenses) for which the aggregate sentences to confinement actually imposed were five years or more; and
(3) they had been convicted of, "a violation of any law or regulation relating to the illicit traffic in narcotic drugs, or who has been convicted of a
violation of any law or regulation governing or controlling the taxing,
manufacture, production, compounding, transportation, sale, exchange,
dispensing, giving away, importation, exportation, or the possession for
the purpose of the manufacture, production, compounding, transportation, sale, exchange, dispensing, giving away, importation or exportation
of opium, coca leaves, heroin, marihuana, or any salt derivative or preparation of opium or coca leaves, or isonipecaine or any addiction-forming
or addiction-sustaining opiate ....
"
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 477, § 212(a) (9), (10), (23), 66 Star.
163 (1952). A person was deportable under the Immigration and Nationality Act
of 1952 if:
(1) they were "convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude committed
within five years after entry and either sentenced to confinement or confined therefor in a prison or corrective institution, for one year or more;"
(2) they were convicted of "two crimes involving moral turpitude, at any
time after entry, not arising out of a single scheme of criminal misconduct, regardless of whether confined for the crimes";
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constant amendments have been made to the Immigration and Nationality Act, most notably in the 1980s and 1990S.103

These

(3) they were convicted of violating any provision of the Act entitled, "An
Act to require the registration of certain persons employed by agencies to
disseminate propaganda in the United States, and for other purposes";
(4) they were convicted of a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1546;
(5) they, at any time, were "convicted of a violation of any law or regulation relating to the illicit traffic in narcotic drugs, or has been convicted
of a violation of any law or regulation governing or controlling the taxing, manufacture, production, compounding, transportation, sale, exchange, dispensing, giving away, importation, exportation, or the possession for the purpose of the manufacture, production, compounding,
transportation, sale, exchange, dispensing, giving away, importation or
exportation of opium, coca leaves, heroin, marihuana, any salt derivative
or preparation of opium or coca leaves or isonipecaine or any addiction forming or addiction sustaining opiate;"
(6) they were convicted at any time after entry of "possessing or carrying
in violation of any law any weapon which shoots or is designed to shoot
automatically or semiautomatically more than one shot without manual
reloading, by a single function of the trigger, or a weapon commonly
called a sawed-off shotgun;"
(7) they have been convicted of violating the Alien Registration Act of
1940 (once within five years of entry or at any time if convicted more
than once);
(8) they have been convicted of various violations of the United States
Code pertaining to foreign relations, explosives, wartime related criminal
acts, military violations, enemy acts, threats against the President, certain
trade and commerce violations; and
(9) they have been convicted of bringing in or harboring an alien for
purposes of prostitution.
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 477, § 241 (a) (4), (5), (11), (14),
(15), (16), (17) & (18), 66 Stat. 163 (1952).
103. There have simply been too many pieces of legislation affecting the immigration laws to list here. This includes not only direct amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act, but also amendments to other federal laws dealing
with appropriations, staffing of the Department of Justice, enforcement activities,
and treatment of and benefits for aliens. However, a few major pieces of legislation in this time period include: the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986,
Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Star. 3359 (1986); Immigration Amendments of 1988, Pub.
L. No. 100-658, 102 Stat. 3908 (1988); the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L.
No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (1988) as amended by Pub. L. No. 102-583, 106 Stat.
4914 (1992); the Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978
(1990); the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996); the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996); and the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322 §
130004, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994).
The Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives reports
approximately 157 pieces of legislation, either amending the Immigration and Nationality Act or otherwise affecting aliens, were enacted into law from 1979-1994
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amendments have added more grounds for preventing someone's
entry into the United States and for deporting them from the
United States.' ° Not all grounds of inadmissibility or deportability
are criminally 6related. 05 Not all criminally related grounds require
a conviction. 1

during the 96th Congress through the 2d session of the 103rd Congress.

See

IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY Aar wiTH NOTES AND RELATED LAws, 104Th CONG.,
BRIEF HISTORY OF UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION PoLIcy 625-40 (1995). This averages

out to approximately 19.6 enactments per year.
104. There are also federal crimes related to immigration matters contained in
Titles 18 and 28 of the United States Code. This article deals with the civil administrative immigration laws-not the federal criminal immigration related laws.
105. Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(a), 8 § U.S.C. §§ 237(a), 1182 &
1227(a) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999).
106. Some of the criminally related grounds of inadmissibility which do not
require a conviction are: illegal reentry after deportation (Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(a) (9), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (9) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999)); admission of having committed a crime involving moral turpitude or a controlled substance (Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(a) (2), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (2) (1994
& Supp. V 1999)); coming to engage in prostitution related activities (or has
within the last 10 years) or unlawful commercialized vices (Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(a) (2) (D), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (2) (D) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999));
reason to believe a person is a drug trafficker (Immigration and Nationality Act §
212(a) (2) (C), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (2) (C) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999)); knowing or reasonably believing that a person will engage in espionage, sabotage, or violate export prohibitions (Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(a) (3) (A), 8 U.S.C. §
1182(a)(3) (A) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999)); reasonably believing a person is or is
likely to engage in any terrorist activity (Immigration and Nationality Act § 212
(a)(3)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (3) (B) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999)); participation in
Nazi persecutions or genocide (Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(a) (3) (E), 8
U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(E) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999)); fraudulently seeking visas, entry
or other immigration benefits (Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(a) (6) (C), 8
U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C) (1994 & Supp. V 1999)); alien smuggling (Immigration
and Nationality Act § 212(a) (6) (E), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (6) (E) (1994 & Supp. IV
1999)); engaging in polygamy in the United States (Immigration and Nationality
Act § 212(a) (10) (A), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (10) (A) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999)); international child abductors (Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(a) (9)(C), 8
U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(C) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999)); unlawfully voting on the local,
state or federal level (Immigration and Nationality Act § 212 (a) (10) (D), 8 U.S.C. §
1182(a) (10) (D) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999)); or falsely claiming United States citizenship (Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(a)(6)(C)(ii), 8 U.S.C. §
1182(a) (6) (C) (ii) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999)).
Examples of criminally related grounds of deportation which do not require a conviction are: if inadmissible under Immigration and Nationality Act §
212 at the time of admission or adjustment of status to lawful permanent resident
(Immigration and Nationality Act § 237(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1) (1994 &
Supp. IV 1999)); alien smuggling (Immigration and Nationality Act
§237(a)(1)(E), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (1) (E) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999)); engaging in
marriage fraud (Immigration and Nationality Act § 237(a) (1) (G), 8 U.S.C. §
1227(a) (1) (G) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999)); being a drug abuser or addict (Immigration and Nationality Act § 237 (a) (2) (B) (ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (2) (B) (ii) (1994 &

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol25/iss4/10

24

1999]

Toews: Citizenship
ConsiderationsCONSIDERATIONS
in Minnesota Criminal Justice and the
CITIZENSHIP

1269

Regarding criminal activity, Congress has changed the grounds
of inadmissibility and deportability. They have modified the waivers for these grounds and restricted other forms of relief from deportation. 107 Congress has also tried to speed up the deportation
process of criminals by holding deportation proceedings in prisons
as well as having a more expeditious administrative deportation
proceeding 1for
certain criminals who do not qualify for relief from
08
deportation.
Supp. IV1999)); violating certain protection orders (Immigration and Nationality
Act § 237(a)(2)(E)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999));
falsely claiming United States citizenship (Immigration and Nationality Act §
237(a) (3) (D), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (3) (D) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999)); engaging in
espionage, sabotage, export violation activities (Immigration and Nationality Act §
237(a) (4) (A) (i), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (4) (A) (i) (1994 & Supp. IV1999)); engaging
in criminal activity which endangers public safety or national security (Immigration and Nationality Act § 237(a) (4) (A) (ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (4) (A) (ii) (1994 &
Supp. IV1999)); engaging in the unlawful opposition to the United States Government (Immigration and Nationality Act § 237(a)(4)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. §
1227(a)(4)(A)(iii) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999)); engaging in terrorist activities (Immigration and Nationality Act § 237(a) (4) (B), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (4) (B) (1994 &
Supp. IV1999)); engaging in Nazi persecution or genocide (Immigration and Nationality Act § 237(a) (4) (D), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4)(D) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999));
and unlawfully voting on the local, state, or federal level (Immigration and Nationality Act § 237(a) (6), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (6) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999)).
107. The most recent, major pieces of legislation in this regard are: the AntiDrug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (1988), as amended
by the International Narcotics Control Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-583, 106 Stat.
4914 (1992); the Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978
(1990); the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996); and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996).
108. These provisions are now codified in the Immigration and Nationality Act
§ 238 and 8 U.S.C. § 1228 (1994 & Supp. IV 1999). In 1986, Congress authorized
the Attorney General to begin deportation proceedings as expeditiously as possible following a criminal conviction. See Immigration Reform and Control Act
(IRCA) of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603 § 701, 100 Stat. 3359, 3445 (1986). Two years

later, Congress expanded on this and provided for "expedited deportation proceedings for aliens convicted of aggravated felonies." Anti-Drug Abuse Act of
1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690 § 7347, 102 Stat. 4181 (1988). These provisions form
the basis of the Institutional Hearing Program ("IHP") in which the Attorney
General conducts deportation hearings in certain state and federal prisons while

an alien is incarcerated on a criminal sentence. The purpose behind this provision is to have the immigration proceeding completed by the time the non-citizen
is released from state or federal custody. By doing this, the Attorney General can
deport non-citizens immediately upon release from criminal custody, instead of
having to take them into federal immigration custody and begin the deportation

hearing at that point.
Administrative deportation refers to a process in which the INS District

Director may issue an order of deportation for certain non-citizens who are not
lawful permanent residents, are convicted of crimes and do not have any relief
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The Intersection of FederalImmigration and State CriminalLaws

Federal immigration law and state criminal laws have intersected throughout our history. Some grounds of deportation under federal law are, and have been, based upon a criminal conviction by a state. Historically, if a state did not consider a person to
be "convicted" under state law for at least one purpose, the noncitizen may not be deportable for that conviction. Also for many
years, federal immigration law specifically allowed state criminal
courts to make judicial recommendations against deportation.
This recommendation, if properly made in accordance with statute
and regulations, including an opportunity for the federal government to be present and to present evidence, prevented the use of
the convictions for certain immigration purposes. Finally, certain
state pardons for crimes would erase the conviction for certain immigration purposes.109
Over the last century, however, Congress has restricted states'
roles in immigration matters. For instance, Congress has now enacted a federal definition of "conviction" in the immigration laws. 110
Regardless of whether a state considers a person "convicted" for
state purposes, so long as the action meets the federal definition, a
non-citizen may be considered "convicted" under federal law. Over
the years, Congress has restricted the authority of the states to issue
judicial recommendations against deportation. " ' Now, Congress
! 2 Concerning
has entirely eliminated this authority."
pardons, Congress has refused to recognize legislative pardons and has reduced
from deportation. This provision was enacted as part of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 130004, 108 Stat.
1796 (1994).
109. Matter of G--,9 1. & N. Dec. 159, 161 (BIA 1960; Att'y Gen. 1961). "[A]
judicial recommendation against deportation or a pardon (whether legislative or
executive) barred deportation proceedings based on the conviction of crime." Id.
(citing Act of Feb. 5, 1917, ch. 29, 39 Stat. 874, 889 (1917)). "No distinction was
made between narcotic and nonnarcotic violations." Id.
110. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(48)(A), 8 U.S.C. §

1101 (a) (48) (A) (1994 & Supp.IV1999).
111. "Section 241(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act eliminated the
legislative pardon as a bar to deportation proceeding. Matter of R-, 5 I. & N. Dec.
612. In 1956, an amendment to section 241(b) provided that a judicial recommendation against deportation or an executive pardon should not apply to an
alien convicted of a narcotic offense (Act of July 18, 1956)." Matter of G-,9 I. &
N. Dec. 159, 161 (BIA 1960; Att'y Gen. 1961).
112. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 505, 8 U.S.C. §1535 (1994 & Supp.
IV 1999) (eliminating the judicial recommendations against deportation, previously found at Immigration and Nationality Act § 241 (b)).
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the recognition of executive pardons to fewer types of convictions. ' 13 In fact, in the federal criminal realm, Assistant United
States Attorneys must have the express concurrence
of the INS be11 4
fore they may agree not to deport a non-citizen.
Along with restricting and reducing states' roles in preventing
deportation, Congress has increased states' roles in working with
the Department of Justice to facilitate deportation. For instance,
Congress now allows states to voluntarily assist the Attorney General
in the investigation, apprehension and detention of non-citizens.
In these situations, state officers are trained in federal law, must
adhere to federal law, and must operate under the direction and
supervision of the Attorney General."5 Congress mandated that the
Attorney General provide twenty-four-hour, daily investigative resources to state and local authorities to determine whether criminals are non-citizens.16 The Attorney General must designate and
train officers to liaison with federal, state and local law enforcement, correctional agencies, and courts regarding the arrest, conviction and release of non-citizens charged with aggravated felonies. The Attorney General must also assist state courts in
identifying non-citizens unlawfully in the United States pending
criminal prosecution."7 Certainly, Congress did not contemplate
assisting states in identifying criminal non-citizens so that the states
could help them escape federal immigration law. Congress has enacted a law facilitating information sharing with the INS of peoples'
immigration status. Specifically, this law prohibits any federal, state
or local government or government official from prohibiting or restricting any government entity or official from maintaining information on, sending information to or receiving information from
the INS regarding someone's immigration status."8 Actually, Congress is concerned that the INS receive prompt notice of convictions. If states wish to receive federal grants for law enforcement
under 42 U.S.C. § 3751, the states must establish a plan to provide,
free of charge and within thirty days of conviction, notice of the
113. See supranote 111 and accompanying text.
114. See28 C.F.R. § 0.197 (1998).
115. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 28 7 (g), 8 U.S.C. § 135 7 (g) (1994 &
Supp. IV 1999).
116. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 236(d)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. §
1226(d) (1)(A) (1994 & Supp. IV. 1999).
117. See id.
118. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-208, Div. C § 642, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996).
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conviction of a non-citizen to the INS. The states must also provide
certified convictions records to the INS within thirty days of a request.' 9
The Attorney General now may reimburse states for the incarceration costs of certain criminal non-citizens, as well as relieve the
state from its incarceration responsibilities by assuming federal cusCongress has declared that not fewer than
tody of the criminal.
ten full-time active duty INS agents will be allocated to enforce the
immigration laws in each state.'2
In this century, we have seen Congress restricting states' roles
in preventing a non-citizen's deportation while increasing states'
roles in facilitating a non-citizen's deportation. Let us now take a
closer look at this development of congressional intent and federal
immigration law in the context of state convictions.
B. Definition of "Conviction"
It may seem at first blush a rather simple matter to apply
fedfor
inadmissibileral immigration law to criminals. Many grounds
ity and deportability clearly state that if someone has been convicted of a certain type of crime, the ground of inadmissibility or
deportability applies. It has not, however, been that easy.
One of the primary difficulties was that until 1996, Congress
had not defined "conviction" in the Immigration and Nationality
Act. Without a federal statutory definition, the BIA was left to fashion a definition for themselves.
Historically, the BIA looked to the laws of the state in which
the person was "convicted." The general analysis the BIA developed was that a conviction existed if: (1) there was a judicial finding of guilt; (2) the case was no longer "pending" (the court ordered a fine, incarceration, or suspended a sentence); and (3) the
state considered the person to be "convicted" for at least one pur119. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3753(a) (11), 3751 (1994 & Supp. III 1997). Congress
enacted the Criminal Identification Technology Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-251,
112 Stat. 1870 (1998), to facilitate interstate criminal justice identification, information, communications and forensics. This specifically provides for the exchange of criminal history records for immigration and naturalization matters. See
Criminal Identification Technology Act, Pub. L. No. 105-251, § 217, 112 Stat. 1870,
1878 (1998).
120. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 241(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(i) (1994 &

Supp. IV 1999).
121.

See Immigration and Nationality Act § 103(f), 8 U.S.C. § 1103(f) (1994 &

Supp. IV 1999).
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pose. 122 This analysis grew out of years of intellectual wading
through varying state criminal procedures. Each state had different procedures and many had deferred adjudication statutes of
varying natures. 123 In order to determine whether a conviction
and/or sentence existed which may be required to establish a
ground for deportation, the BIA examined the sufficiency of state
expungements,124 suspension of the imposition of a sentence, 125 sus122. See Matter of Seda, 17 I. & N. Dec. 550, 552 (BIA 1980) (citing Matter of
Robison, 16 1. & N. Dec. 401 (BIA 1963)).
123. See Matter of R- R-, 7 1. & N. Dec. 478, 484 (BIA 1957). The Board held
that a conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude existed for immigration
purposes under Texas law when a non-citizen pled and was adjudicated guilty, was
sentenced to three years imprisonment but the execution of the sentence was suspended in lieu of three years probation. See id. Upon release from probation, the
non-citizen, under Texas law, may be discharged and the conviction expunged.
Until this happens, however, the non-citizen has been convicted and is deportable
for the crime. See Matter of G-, 7 I. & N. Dec. 171, 174 (BIA 1956) (holding that
under Massachusetts law, a non-citizen found guilty and sentenced to hard labor,
but whose execution of sentence was suspended and placed on probation, and
then six months later the complaint was dismissed, was not deportable on the basis
of the conviction because the conviction was not "final"). See also Matter of H-, 6
I. & N. Dec. 619, 623 (BIA 1955; Att'y Gen. 1955) (explaining that good moral
character may be found when a crime involving moral turpitude under the California deferred adjudication statute is expunged).
124. See Matter of O-T-,
4 I. & N. Dec. 265 (C.O. 1951). The California deferred adjudication statute was examined in reference to a petty theft conviction.
See id. at 266. The non-citizen was sentenced to 90 days in jail, 60 days suspended
if he did not commit other crimes in the next two years. See id. at 265. Later, the
plea of guilty was withdrawn and the case dismissed. See id. However, by this time,
California courts had held that for some purposes under state law, an expungement under this law did not erase a conviction. See id. at 265-66. However, the
INS Central Office noted that a federal district court nevertheless held that an expungement under California law erases a conviction for naturalization purposes.
See id. at 268; see also In re Ringnalda, 48 F. Supp. 975 (S.D. Cal. 1943). In In re
Paoli, 49 F. Supp. 128 (N.D. Cal. 1943), the court held that while an expungement
under California law may erase the conviction for naturalization purposes, the underlying conduct could be considered in determining good moral character. The
INS Central Office then, citing an apparent disagreement between the state and
federal courts later held that, "[a]ccordingly, no change appears to be warranted
in the present view of the Service to the effect that in cases such as in the instant
one the charges are not sustained." Matter of 0- T-, 4 1. & N. Dec. at 268.
The lack of a federal definition of "conviction" and the struggle to define
"conviction" for immigration purposes came to a head in Matter of A-F-, 8 I. &
N. Dec. 429 (BIA 1959). In this case, the BIA upheld the deportation of a noncitizen who had been convicted in California for dealing in marijuana. See id. at
438. The non-citizen was found guilty, the proceedings were suspended, he was
placed on five years probation and as a condition of the probation, he served one
year in a countyjail. See id. at 442. The issue, which was then presented to the Attorney General, was an apparent conflict between this decision and an earlier decision. Compare Matter of D-, 7 I. & N. Dec. 670 (BIA 1958) with Matter ofA-F-,
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time as a
pension of the execution of a sentence, and whether jail
126
imprisonment.
to
sentence
a
was
probation
of
condition
Even so, states continually developed new criminal procedures
and the BIA's definition of conviction became outdated. For instance, depending upon the state criminal procedures, non-citizens
in different states who were guilty of the same criminal behavior
may not be treated the same under the immigration laws. The BIA
found this unacceptable. For example, as the Board stated in Matter of Ozkok: 127
[A] lien A, who has been found guilty of a narcotics violation by ajury or judge, and who was placed on probation,
fined, and even incarcerated as a special condition of
8 I. & N. Dec. 429, 438-39 (BIA 1959, Att'y Gen. 1959). The main struggle was in
defining conviction in the absence of a federal definition. See Matter of A-F-, 8 I.
& N. Dec. at 444. The Attorney General upheld the order of deportation. See id.
at 446. Regarding the conflict with Matter of D-, 7 I. & N. Dec. at 674, that once a
drug conviction was set aside and dismissed under state law it could not support
deportation, but until that time it could, the Attorney General overruled the BIA.
See id. In short, the Attorney General found clear congressional policy "that Congress did not intend that aliens convicted of narcotic violations should escape deportation because, as in California, the State affords a procedure authorizing a
technical erasure of the conviction." Matter of A-F-, 8 I. & N. Dec. at 445. This
holding was followed in Matter of Kelly, 10 I. & N. Dec. 526 (BIA 1964) and Matter
of Tsimbidy-Rochu, 13 I. & N. Dec. 56 (BIA 1968). This Attorney General ruling
was limited to narcotic convictions and not extended to crimes involving moral
turpitude. See Matter of G-, 9 I. & N. Dec. 159 (BIA 1960; Att'y Gen. 1961); Matter
of Gutnick, 13 I. & N. Dec. 672 (BIA 1971). This ruling has also been followed in
case of a "correction of sentence" with a subsequent dismissal without a discussion
of the reason behind the "correction." See Matter of lbarra-Obando, 12 I. & N. Dec.
576 (BIA 1966; Att'y Gen. 1967). See also Matter of Wong, 12 I. & N. Dec. 721, 723
(BIA 1968). The Board determined that a plea of guilty to a drug charge, suspended pronouncement of judgment, two years probation, and subsequent withdrawal of plea and dismissal, is a conviction for immigration purposes. See id. In
California, a plea of guilty was considered conviction. See id. at 724.
125. See Matter ofJohnson, 11 1. & N. Dec. 401, 408 (BIA 1965) (holding that a
stay of imposition of sentence under Washington law is considered a conviction
for at least one purpose under Washington law and is, therefore, a conviction for
immigration purposes).
126. See Matter ofF-, 1 1. & N. Dec. 343, 348 (BIA 1942). A California conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude under section 1203.4 of California statutes does not support deportation under the Immigration Act of 1917, which requires a sentence to imprisonment for a term of one year of more. See id. The
non-citizen was sentenced to one year at the county jail but that was a term of probation-not a sentence to imprisonment. See id. Also, section 1203.4 allows for
later setting aside of guilt and dismissal of proceedings-even though the conviction may be used in a subsequent criminal proceeding. See id.
127. 19 I. & N. Dec. 546 (BIA 1988).
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probation, but who has no right to appeal and is subject to
automatic entry of a judgment upon violation of probation, would not be considered "convicted" under our
three-pronged test because there has been no judicial adjudication of guilt. On the other hand, we would find a
conviction in the case of alien B, who pleaded nolo contendere to the same charge, but whose sentence was deferred with no other penalty imposed, so long as the state
also considered him convicted for some purpose.
To overcome this different treatment, which was the result not
of different criminal behavior but of different states' criminal procedures, the BIA revisited and revised its definition of conviction in
Matter of Ozkok:

As in the past, we shall consider a person convicted if the
court has adjudicated him guilty or has entered a formal
judgment of guilt....
Where adjudication of guilt has been withheld, however, further examination of the specific procedure used
and the state authority under which the court acted will
be necessary. As a general rule, a conviction will be found
for immigration purposes where all of the following elements are present:
(1) a judge or jury has found the alien guilty or he
has entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere or has
admitted sufficient facts to warrant a finding of guilty;
(2) the judge has ordered some form of punishment,
penalty, or restraint on the person's liberty to be imposed (including but not limited to incarceration,
probation, a fine or restitution, or community-based
sanctions such as a rehabilitation program, a workrelease or study-release program, revocation or suspension of a driver's license, deprivation of nonessential activities or privileges, or community service); and
(3) a judgment or adjudication of guilt may be entered if the person violates the terms of his probation
or fails to comply with the requirements of the
128.

Id. at 550-51.
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court's order, without availability of further proceedings regarding the person's guilt or innocence of the
original charge.1 2
The BIA recognized that "[t] he procedures vary from state to
state and include provisions for annulling or setting aside the conviction, permitting withdrawal of the plea, sealing the records after
completion of a sentence or probation, and deferring adjudication
of guilt with dismissal of proceedings following a probationary period."30
Congress, however, grew dissatisfied with this definition of
conviction developed by the BIA. It became apparent that this
definition, although an improvement, still did not adequately apply
to varying state criminal ameliorative provisions. Congress was frustrated that aliens who were clearly guilty of criminal activity were
escaping the reach of the federal immigration laws, partly as a result of differences in state laws. In 1996, Congress finally defined
"conviction" for immigration purposes:
The term "conviction" means, with respect to an alien, a
formal judgment of guilt of the alien entered by a court
or, if adjudication of guilt has been withheld, where(i) a judge or jury has found the alien guilty or the alien
has entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere or has
admitted sufficient facts to warrant a finding of guilt, and
(ii) the judge has ordered some form of punishment,
31
penalty, or restraint on the alien's liberty to be imposed.
Now, for the first time, the Immigration and Nationality Act
contains a uniform federal definition of "conviction" and it is clear
that Congress is focusing on the criminal act, i.e., indications of
guilt and some punishment by the state. The expressed congressional intent behind the new definition of "conviction" is:

129. Id. at 551-52.
130. Id. at 550. The BIA also reaffirmed that, generally speaking, the Attorney
General will not recognize expungements of drug convictions, but will recognize a
state expungement of a crime involving moral turpitude. See id. at 552. The BIA
did not discuss the issue of federal supremacy when the reason for the expungement was to enable the non-citizen to avoid federal immigration law.
131. Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(48), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)
(1994 & Supp. IV 1999).
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This section deliberately broadens the scope of the definition of "conviction" beyond that adopted by the Board of
Immigration Appeals in Matter of Ozkok, 19 I & N Dec. 546
(BIA 1988). As the Board noted in Ozkok, there exist in
the various States a myriad of provisions for ameliorating
the effects of a conviction. As a result, aliens who have
clearly been guilty of criminal behavior and whom Congress intended to be considered "convicted" have escaped
the immigration consequences normally attendant upon a
conviction. Ozkok, while making it more difficult for alien
criminals to escape such consequences, does not go far
enough to address situations where a judgment of guilt or
imposition of sentence is suspended, conditioned upon
the alien's future good behavior .... This new provision.., clarifies Congressional intent that even in cases
where adjudication is "deferred," the original finding or
confession of guilt is sufficient to establish
a "conviction"
3
for purposes of the immigration laws.1 1
But aside from whether a state judicial action meets the definition of conviction, what about those cases in which a state court
helps a non-citizen escape deportation by vacating a conviction, entering a new, more favorable order or changing the sentence imposed?
C. JudiciallyEscaping the Immigration Laws

Before and after this federal definition of "conviction," noncitizens who believed that they will be considered "convicted" for
immigration purposes sought relief from the criminal courts by asking to have their convictions ameliorated under different provisions, e.g., expungements, changed sentences, withdrawal of guilty
pleas, vacations of convictions, writs of audita querela and writs of coram nobis. Private immigration practitioners have long sought to
132. Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference, H.R. CoNF.
REP. No. 828, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. 224 (1996), 142 CONG. REc. H10841-02 (1996
WL 539315). See also generally Matter of Punu, Int. Dec. 3364 (BIA 1998) (using this
new federal definition of "conviction," the BIA held that deferred adjudications
under Texas law were "convictions" under the Immigration and Nationality Act);
Matter of Roldan, Int. Dec. 3377, 19-20 (BIA 1999). The new statutory definition of

conviction includes state rehabilitative statutes. See id. A conviction still exists for
immigration purposes notwithstanding the operation of a rehabilitative statute
purporting to erase the conviction. See id.
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educate criminal defense attorneys on the immigration consequences of criminal actions so that better criminal pleas may be
made and post-conviction relief obtained. 133 These actions directly
raise the issues of whether or what kind of post-conviction relief is
available and, if so, the supremacy of the federal immigration laws.
The BIA's treatment of state post-conviction actions has varied with
the explicitness of federal law on the issue.
For instance, when states had authority under federal law to
make judicial recommendations against deportation, the BIA refused to recognize vacations of convictions to cure defective recommendations or to order one when it was not properly done in
the first place.13 4 The BIA distinguished between the state court's
jurisdiction to vacate the conviction and enter the judicial recommendation of deportation order with the effect of the action under
federal immigration law.135 While conceding that the state court
presumably had the authority to vacate the conviction and resentence the non-citizen under the state law in question, the BIA did
not recognize the date of the resentencing for purposes of triggering the time in which the court could properly issue a judicial recommendation against deportation ('JRAD") .' In other words, the
judicial recommendation against deportation must have been
made properly after the initial sentencing and, if not, a court cannot resentence the non-citizen in order to "cure" the failure to
133. See generally, e.g., DAN KESSELBRENNER & LORY D. ROSENBERG, IMMIGRATION
LAW AND CRIMES (Norton Tooby ed., 1998); CHARLES GORDON ET AL., IMMIGRATION
LAW ANfl PROCEDURE (Matthew Bender ed., 1998); MARI
LALDINI-POTERMIN,
DEFENDING NON-CITIZENS IN MINNESOTA COURTS: A SUMMARY OF PROVISIONS OF
IMMIGRATION LAW AND CLIENT SCENARIOS (Immigration Law Center of Minnesota,
1998).
134. See Matter of B-, 8 1. & N. Dec. 686, 688 (BIA 1960). See also Matterof P-,
9 I. & N. Dec. 293, 295 (Att'y Gen. 1961); Matter of S-,9 I. & N. Dec. 678, 682-83
(BIA 1962). In Matter of S-,the non-citizen was convicted in federal district court
of tax evasion and tax fraud. See 9 I. & N. Dec. at 679. He was sentenced to three
years imprisonment and payment of a $10,000 fine. See id. at 680. He paid the
fine, served one year and was paroled. See id. After his release on parole, the fed-

eral district court allowed him to withdraw his plea of nolo contendere. See id. He
pled nolo contendere and was sentenced to one day. See id. This new sentencing
was sought so that the alien could now apply for a judicial recommendation
against deportation. See id. at 681. Aside from the judicial recommendation
against deportation issue, the BIA noted that the federal district court had the
authority to resentence the alien and that they are bound by the new sentence. See
id. The new sentence, in fact, did not sustain the ground for deportability that required a year or more. See id. at 682.
135. See generally Matter of S-,9 I & N. Dec. at 682-83.
136. See id. at 681.
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properly make a recommendation against deportation. The BIA
said in this situation that the state courts have attempted to "invade
an area to which Congress has seen fit to erect or impose a federal
standard in regard to recommendations against deportation as
provided in section 241 (b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.
We find that in intruding into this federal area, the court's action
was ineffective .. .,13 Federal courts of appeal agreed that state
attempts to "cure" the absence of a JRAD are invalid.' "To allow
the state court's action to be effective would be to permit the court
to do indirectly what it could not do directly, and to circumvent the
federal standard." 39
Federal courts have also highly criticized attempts to use writs
of coram nobis and audita querela to avoid deportation. As the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held:
The state prosecuting officials would normally have no
interest in opposing such a vacation and reentry, since it
in no way affects the liability of the prisoner under state
law, and as here they consequently would have no interest
in appealing even an apparently erroneous employment
of a state coram nobis or habeas corpus proceeding for
this purpose.
Conversely, the United States and its officers are concerned in these cases solely with the administration of
[U.S.C.] § 1251, and they have no interest in the merits or
propriety of coram nobis or habeas corpus proceedings as
they affect the underlying conviction. The result of the
adoption of relator's contention here would therefore be
to vest in the substantially uncontrolled discretion of the
trial courts of the states the power to avoid the careful
time limitations of [U.S.C.] § 1251(b), in plain conflict
with the manifest intention of Congress.'4
Non-citizens in both federal and state courts have applied for
writs of coram nobis and audita querela in order to vacate their criminal convictions to avoid deportation or to be able to apply for an
137.
138.

Id.
See, e.g., Zaitona v. INS, 9 F.3d 432, 436, 37 (6th Cir. 1993); United States

ex rel. Piperkoffv. Esperdy, 267 F.2d 72 (2d Cir. 1959); but see Sawkow v. INS, 314

F.2d 34, 37 (3d Cir. 1963).
139.
140.

Zaitona, 9 F.3d at 437.
Esperdy, 267 F.2d at 75; but see Sawkow, 314 F.2d at 34.
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immigration benefit. These writs are similar. A writ of, "coram nobis... attack [s] a judgment that was infirm at the time it was rendered for reasons that later came to light. Audita querela... attack[s] a judgment that was correct when rendered but later was
rendered infirm by matters arising after is rendition." 141 A writ of
audita querela is used "to obtain relief against the consequences of
the judgment on account of some matter of defense or discharge
arising since its rendition and which could not be taken advantage
To date, six federal circuit courts of appeal have
of otherwise."
looked at the availability of these writs to vacate a criminal conviction for the purpose of erasing the conviction for immigration
have held that it cannot be done;
purposes. All six courts of appeal
43
these are not writs of equity.
Particularly interesting is that a few of these courts mention
the concern that granting such a writ would violate the separation
of powers between the executive immigration authority and the
role of the judiciary.1" Since these cases involved federal convictions, as opposed to state convictions, the supremacy issue was not
involved. However, the courts did discuss their concern regarding
separation of powers. For example, the Reyes court stated:
When a court vacates an otherwise final conviction because the defendant faces deportation, the court tends to
usurp the power of Congress to set naturalization and deportation standards and the power of the INS to administer those standards in each individual case, as well as the
power of the executive to prosecute criminal offenses.
Similarly, in such instances the "pure equity" version of
audita querela to some extent trenches upon the power
141. Doe v. INS, 120 F.3d 200, 203 n.4 (9th Cir. 1997).
142. United States v. Holder, 936 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1991).
143. See United States v. Ayala, 894 F.2d 425, 428-29 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Holder,
936 F.2d at 5; United States v. LaPlante, 57 F.3d 252, 253 (2d Cir. 1995); United
States v. Reyes, 945 F.2d 862, 866 (5th Cir. 1991); United States v. Banda, 1 F.3d
354, 356 (5th Cir. 1993);Jimenez v. Trominski, 91 F.3d 767, 768 (5th Cir. 1996);
United States v. Johnson, 962 F.2d 579, 581-82 (7th Cir. 1992); Doe, 120 F.3d at
204; Beltran-Leon v. INS, 134 F.3d 1379, 1380 (9th Cir. 1998). Compare lower
court decisions United States v. Salgado, 692 F. Supp. 1265, 1269 (E.D. Wash.
1988) and United States v. Ghebreziabher, 701 F. Supp. 115, 117 (E.D. La. 1988)
(granting writs of audita querela to erase the convictions for immigration purposes). Salgado and Ghebreziabherwere roundly criticized by the courts of appeals
as misconstruing the writ of audita querela.
144. See, e.g., Reyes, 945 F.2d at 866; Johnson, 962 F.2d at 582; Doe, 120 F.3d at
204.
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and discretion of the President to pardon. Absent a
clearer statutory or historical basis, an Article III court
should not arrogate such power unto itself. We, too, operate under the law. Reyes' argument that it is unfair to
deport him solely on the basis of an isolated
145 conviction
properly belongs in other fora, not the courts.
The Johnson court explained:
We have a delicately balanced system - one that depends
on a separation of powers. In this instance, Congress is
vested with the power to enact immigration legislation, including deportation standards. The executive is empowered to prosecute criminal offenses. Vacating a valid conviction through the purely equitable use of audita querela
amounts to an end run around properly enacted immigration legislation and essentially rewrites § 241 (a) (11) of the
Act, which provides for deportation of an alien convicted
of a violation of the Controlled Substances Act. The
courts may not tinker with this balance without sufficient
statutory, or even historical, authority. Requiring a legal
defect as a prerequisite to relief via audita querela assures
us that the writ will not disturb this fine balance.14
The separation-of-powers concern expressed by these courts
applies with equal force to state action. Moreover, these concerns
are fundamentally similar to the preemption and supremacy concerns. In short, courts are making decisions that are not their decisions to make.
The issue before these courts of appeal was the appropriateness of granting a writ to vacate a federal criminal conviction. But
what happens when a state court grants a writ of audita querela and
the non-citizen argues in immigration court that the conviction no
longer exists? The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Beltran-Leon
v. INS,17 recently ruled that the writ of audita querela granted by a
state court does not erase the conviction for immigration purposes. 4 8 In a short decision, the court held that a writ of auditaque145.
146.
147.
148.
ever, it

Reyes, 945 F.2d at 866.
Johnson, 962 F.2d at 582.
134 F.3d 1379 (9th Cir. 1998).
See id. at 1380-81. The BIA decision is an unpublished decision. Howis apparent from the Ninth Circuit decision that the BIA refused to recog-
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rela could only issue for legal defects in the conviction or sentence
and not for equities or gross injustice. In this case, the non-citizen
sought the writ "solely in order to prevent deportation and the subsequent hardship to himself and his family. Therefore, the state
court's writ of audita querela did not remove the legal basis of Bel49
law."
tran-Leon's conviction for purposes of application of federal

The Ninth Circuit noted that although a150state (not federal) court
issued the writ, the same principles apply.
In the area of state courts attempting to cure defective judicial
recommendations, the lack of state court authority to take such actions has been relatively clear. The BIA has not hesitated in deciding that the state actions should not be recognized for federal immigration purposes. But in reviewing state judicial actions other
than "curing" defective judicial recommendations against deportation, the Department ofJustice has had a more difficult time.
In the last fifty years of its administrative case law, the United
States Department of Justice has examined the supremacy issue
only a few times, and not at great length. This could be for several
reasons. The issue may not have been raised or properly framed.
The facts and reasons underlying the judicial action may not have
been clear. The BIA has been hesitant to find that a criminal court
acted for the sole purpose of helping an alien escape the reach of
federal law.15 ' Yet, perhaps most significantly, the BIA was acting in
an area intermingled with state law. It acted, at the time of these
decisions, without a federal definition of "conviction." And, as previously mentioned, the Immigration and Nationality Act in fact
conferred the authority upon states to make "judicial recommendations against deportation." 1 2 Congressional intent had not been as
nize the state writ of audita querela. Cf Matter of C-, 8 I. & N. Dec. 276, 277-79
(BIA 1959) (recognizing a state grant of a writ of coram nobis as effective after the
date the writ was granted); Matter of Sirhan, 13 I. & N. Dec. 592, 598 (BIA 1970)
(opining that a state court would have the authority under a writ of coram nobis to
vacate a conviction when deportation was not originally contemplated). The continued viability of these old decisions is now sharply drawn into question.
149. Beltran-Leon, 134 F.3d at 1380-81.
150. See id. at 1380 n.1.
151. See, e.g., Matter ofO'Sullivan, 10 1. & N. Dec. 320, 330 (BIA 1963); Matter of
Sirhan, 13 I. & N. Dec. at 599.
152. The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 477, § 241(b) (2), 66
Stat. 163 (1952) provides that:
The provisions of subsection (a) (4) respecting the deportation of an
alien convicted of a crime or crimes shall not apply... (2) if the court
sentencing such alien for such crimes shall make, at the time of first im-
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fully developed or expressed as it has been in the last twenty years.
The Department of Justice may well have been unsure where to
draw the line when it was deciding these cases. As a result, the Department of Justice focused on the legal authority of the state court
in taking the action more than on the next issue of whether the action, although proper under state law, is preempted by federal law.
But even within the historical context of a larger state role in
immigration matters, the Department of Justice has recognized
federal supremacy of immigration laws. In 1959, the Attorney
General refused to recognize state court actions expunging drug
convictions because congressional intent at that time was not to
have non-citizens escape immigration law based upon expungements of drug convictions. The Attorney General limited this ruling to expungements of drug convictions and did not extend it to
expungements of crimes involving moral turpitude because, in
1961, "there [was] no Congressional signpost pointing in the opposite direction ....
In other words, the Attorney General found
congressional intent to be clearly intolerant of non-citizens who
commit drug crimes, but not as clearly intolerant for other crimes.
Perhaps the most thorough written exploration conducted by
the BIA on this issue was Matter of O'Sullivan.155 In Matter of
1 56
O'Sullivan,
the Board held that a Michigan vacation of conviction
and granting of a new trial erased a drug conviction for federal
immigration purposes. 1 7 The Board held it would recognize the
posing judgment or passing sentence, or within thirty days thereafter, a
recommendation to the Attorney General that such alien not be deported, due notice having been given prior to making such recommendation to representatives of the interested States, the Service, and prose-

cution authorities, who shall be granted an opportunity to make
representations in the matter. The provisions of this subsection shall not
apply in the case of any alien who is charged with being deportable from

the United States under subsection (a) (11) of this section.
Id.
153. See Matter of A-F--, 8 I. & N. Dec. 429, 445-46 (BIA 1959, Att'y Gen.
1959) ("Congress did not intend that aliens convicted of narcotic violations should
escape deportation because the State affords a procedure authorizing a technical
erasure of the conviction.").
154. Matter of G-, 9 1. & N. Dec. 159, 169 (BIA 1960, Att'y Gen. 1961). The
BIA refused to recognize a vacation of a crime involving moral turpitude. See id. at
162. After the Board rendered its decision, the Attorney General reversed the
Board. See id. at 169.
155. 10 I. & N. Dec. 320 (BIA 1963).
156. See id.
157. See id. at 322. This vacation of a drug conviction is distinguished from the
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vacation so long as the state court had jurisdiction to vacate the
conviction and there was not a contrary overriding national standard based upon an overriding national interest:
Whatever on this record the requirements of full faith and
credit may be, it is evident the action of the trial court may
be disregarded, as the Service urges, only if the court exceeded it [sic] power under state law, or if its action, regardless of whether proper under state law, is ineffective
in the federal proceedings, because of a federal standard
based upon overriding national interest. It is also evident
that if the action of the trial court is given effect the deportation proceedings no longer have any basis.""
The Board found that: (1) there was insufficient evidence that
the state court entered its order solely to defeat federal immigration laws; (2) there was insufficient evidence that the state court
lacked jurisdiction to enter the order; and (3) there was not, directly or indirectly, an overriding federal standard, although the
Board acknowledged a strong national interest. 9 The Board
stated:
Reading Matter of A-F- in the light of these three recent
cases under section 241 (b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act presents a strong argument that any judicial
action to set aside a narcotic conviction solely for the purpose of enabling avoidance of deportation would be ineffective. To hold otherwise might permit a court to do by
indirection what it could not do directly. The law is far
from clear here on the federal question, however. 16
The Board concluded in Matter of O'Sullivan however, for the
reasons mentioned above, that "[i]nsofar as these matters are in
doubt the doubts should be resolved in favor of the respondent."'6'
In the mixture of these cases recognizing federal supremacy
were administrative cases that did not thoroughly analyze or adexpungement of a drug conviction (which the Attorney General does not recognize). See Matterof A-F-, 8 I. & N. Dec. at 445-46.
158. Matterof O'Sullivan, 10 1. & N. Dec. at 322.
159. See id. at 330.
160. Id. at 329.
161. Id. at 330.
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dress the supremacy issues. These decisions concerned actions by
the state court that did not merely resentence a criminal to the
same sentence and then purport to grant a judicial recommendation against deportation. Rather, these cases concerned state
courts imposing new sentences that would not render a criminal
deportable from the United States under the Immigration and Nationality Act.
One of the earliest reported cases in the Immigration and Nationality Act Decisions was Matter of P-, 62 a case decided not by the
BIA, but by the INS Central Office. The non-citizen was convicted
of armed robbery and sentenced to prison for twenty to forty years
in Michigan. 6 3 At the time of the conviction, the criminal court
was unaware that the non-citizen criminal defendant could be deported because of the criminal conviction. 64 The non-citizen
After
served twelve years in prison and was released on parole.
his release, he filed a motion for a new trial to erase the conviction
in order to avoid deportation. 66 The court granted the motion.6 7
He pled guilty, the court accepted the plea, placed him on probation for sixty days and the court entered ajudicial recommendation
against deportation.'6 Regardless of this recommendation against
deportation, the new sentence alone did not render the criminal
deportable. In other words, the criminal court need not have entered the recommendation.
In recognizing this vacation of conviction and new order, the
INS Central Office held in 1948 that it was within the authority of
criminal court to do so. "[I] t is clear the alien seeks to escape deportation by invoking a novel procedure. At the retrial he again
pleaded guilty to the original charge, the only new factors presented being the allegations of his good conduct. Nevertheless, ...
the respondent is not now deportable." 6
162. 3 I. & N. Dec. 187 (C.O. 1948).
163. See id.
164. See id.
165. See id.
166. See id.
167. See id. at 187-88.
168. See id. at 188.
169. Id. at 188. In support of its decision, the INS Central Office cited to an
apparently now unreported BIA decision. See id. (citing Matter of C-, 56090/576
(BIAJan. 8, 1944)). "'While it has been the view of this Service that such proceedings on the part of courts for the apparent purpose of defeating deportation is irregular, such cases have not been contested, or if so, without success.'" Id. at 189.
Matterof C- was referred to the United States District Court for the Southern Dis-
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Nine years later, in Matter of V--, 17 the BIA recognized state action on a conviction that eliminated the immigration consequences
for the conviction.17"' In this case, the state court vacated the original sentence (which imposed a sentence but suspended its execution) and entered a new sentence (which suspended the imposition
of sentence). 2 There was no discussion of the reasons for resentencing.
In 1961, the BIA continued to recognize state court action vacating a conviction and providing a new trial, conviction and sentence that did not render the criminal deportable from the United
States. 7 3 The BIA distinguished this case from that of a court seeking to cure a defective judicial recommendation against deportation, and noted that the Attorney General only refuses to recognize
state actions erasing drug convictions. 7 4 Since this conviction was
for breaking and entering and not for a drug crime, and the state
a new trial and
had the authority to vacate the conviction and have
S 175
Once again,
new sentence, the BIA recognized the state action.
however, the state court did not discuss the underlying reason for a

trict of New York. In an unreported decision, the district court held that a conviction set aside and vacated would not sustain deportability. See id. at 189. The
court explained:
The Service questioned the correctness of Judge Conger's decision and
on August 30, 1940, recommended to the Solicitor General that an appeal be taken. The principal argument made was that the proceedings
subsequent to the imposition of the original sentence was invalid because
the respondent was not present at the subsequent proceedings as required under Michigan law. However, it seems to have been conceded
that had the respondent personally attended such proceedings, the supersedingjudgment would be effective. On September 17, 1940, the Acting Solicitor General directed that no appeal be taken.
Id. at 190. Please note, with subsequent changes to the INA, this criminal would
remain deportable with the amended sentence. See INA §§ 237(a) (2) (iii) and
101 (a) (43) (A).
170. 7 I. & N. Dec. 577 (BIA 1957).
171. See id.
172. See id. at 578.
173. See Matter ofH-, 91. & N. Dec. 380 (BIA 1961).
174. See id. at 381-82.
175. See id. at 381. The BIA also cited favorably to the early INS Central Office
decision of Matter of P-, which recognized new criminal sentencing actually
changing the sentence imposed. See id. at 382; see also Matter of P-, 3 I. & N. Dec.
187, 188 (C.O. 1948). The BIA also cited favorably to Matter of C-, 8 I. & N. Dec.
276, 279 (BIA 1959), in which the BIA recognized a state grant of a writ of coram
nobis as effective after the date the writ was granted.
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new trial.
The BIA once again considered state court action vacating
convictions and imposing new sentences in 1970.176 After deciding
that the state court had the authority under state law to take the action, the BIA, without discussion, simply rejected the argument of
supremacy and preemption. 77 The BIA did add, however, that it
found insufficient evidence that the state court acted to defeat federal law. " [W] e do point out that while the inference can be drawn
that the court here was motivated by a desire to remove the aliens
from liability to deportation, it is possible
that other considerations
78
entered into their deliberations."
In keeping with its view that state action taken without authority under state law will not be recognized for federal immigration
purposes, the BIA, in 1961 and 1975, refused to recognize a Michigan state court action vacating a conviction and a California court
action setting aside a guilty verdict and allowing a non-citizen to
plead to a lesser offense. 179 In these cases, the courts lacked jurisdiction under its state law to take the actions, regardless of the reason for the state action. 8 0
Four years later, in Matter of Kaneda,'8' the BIA again dismissed
a supremacy argument.82 The BIA examined whether they should
recognize the state dismissal of criminal proceedings in light of the
argument that the state court judge appeared to have taken this
18
criminal action to allow the non-citizen to escape deportation. 3
The state order explained that the charges were dismissed for de176. See Matter of Sirhan, 13 1. & N. Dec. 592, 594 (BIA 1970).
177. See id. at 599 (citing Matter ofO'Sullivan, 101. & N. Dec. 320 (BIA 1963)).
178. Id.
179. See Matter of H-, 9 I. & N. Dec. 460, 462-63 (BIA 1961); Matter of Tucker,
15 I. & N. Dec. 337, 340 (BIA 1975).
180. Matter of H-, 9 I. & N. Dec. at 462-63; Matter of Tucker, 15 I. & N. Dec. at
340.
181. 16 I. & N. Dec. 677 (BIA 1979).
182. See id. at 679. The non-citizen was arrested for possessing 4,448 grams of
marijuana. See id. at 678. He pled guilty to possession of marijuana and was sentenced to 12 months confinement in a county jail with four months suspended.
See id. Three months later, the criminal court rescinded the sentence, placed him
on probation and provided that once the jail term was completed, the case would
be dismissed pursuant to the Virginia first offender statute. See id. The case was
subsequently dismissed. See id. The BIA first examined whether, in accordance
with its policy to honor dismissal of cases under state first offender statutes that are
counterparts to the Federal First Offender Statute, the conviction supported deportability. See id. at 678-79. The Board held that the Virginia statute was a counterpart and that the dismissal would be effective. See id. at 679.
183. See id.
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portation purposes.s 4 The INS appeared to frame the criminal
dismissal order as being essentially a judicial recommendation
against deportation and, therefore, not valid for drug convictions.
The INS also argued that the criminal court lacked jurisdiction to
enter the subsequent order. '8
In rejecting these arguments, the BIA simply stated:
We have held that where a conviction is revoked and the
charge dismissed by a trial judge that conviction cannot
be used to sustain a finding of deportability....

We have

also specifically held that when the Service claims that a
trial judge lacked authority to dismiss a criminal charge
after a conviction, such lack of jurisdiction must be affirmatively shown. Here the Service has submitted no evidence that the trial judge lacked jurisdiction under Virginia law to rescind the respondent's conviction.
Furthermore, the prosecution has not challenged the trial
judge's rescission and dismissal of the charges which also
indicates that the trial judge's actions were proper.186
Unfortunately, this cursory treatment of the supremacy issue
did not fully address the issue as framed in the cited cases, nor did
it further the administrative case law in this area. The BIA only addressed the issue of whether the state court had authority to take
the action under state law. The BIA stopped short of examining
supremacy and preemption, which would involve an analysis of
ever-evolving congressional intent and regulation in the federal
More recently, in 1996, the BIA held that a firearms conviction
expunged under a California deferred adjudication statute erases
the conviction for immigration purposes.1 7 There was no discus-

sion of evading immigration laws as being the purpose behind the
expungement. 88 Therefore, there was no discussion of the supremacy issue. Despite changes in federal and state law since 1959,
the majority felt bound by the Attorney General's decision in Matter
of A-F-, 6 which limited the Attorney General's refusal to recog184.

See id.

185.
186.
187.

See id. at 679-80.
Id. (citations omitted).
See Matter of Luviano-Rodriguez, Int. Dec. 3267 (BIA 1996).

188.

See id.

189.

See id. (citing Matter of A-F-, 8 I. & N. Dec. 429 (BIA 1959, Att'y Gen.
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nize expungements to drug conviction expungements.'90 However,
the dissent by Board Members Hurwitz and Vacca did broach the
supremacy issue.'9
Since Congress federally defined "conviction" in 1996, the BIA
has been applying this definition. In doing so, the BIA is changing
its administrative caselaw. First, in Matter of Punu 9 2 the Board held
that a deferred adjudication under Texas law (in which after a plea
of guilty or nolo contendere, a court may defer proceedings without adjudicating guilt and place the defendant on probation) is a
conviction under federal immigration law.9
Second, in Matter of
95
Roldan,19 4 the Board overruled Matter of Luviano-RodriguezP
(their
1996 firearms expungement decision) and held that a conviction
exists for immigration purposes notwithstanding a state rehabilitative statute which "purports to abrogate what would otherwise be
considered a conviction."

96

The BIA stated:

We also note that the expansive definition in section
101 (a) (48) (A) of the Act is consistent with the prevailing
congressional policy of strict treatment toward criminal
aliens in deportation proceedings. Congress may condition the status of an alien upon the absence of a "conviction" as it chooses to define that term....
An alien who has been the beneficiary of a state rehabilitative statute may continue to be subject to a severe

1959)).
190. See id.
191. See id. In dealing with the supremacy issue, the dissent used the term
"federalism" and spoke of the changes in immigration law and the definition of
"conviction" since the 1961 Attorney General's decision in Matter of G-. See id.
(citing Matter of G-, 9 I. & N. Dec. 159, 169 (BIA 1960, Att'y Gen. 1961)). The
dissent also explored California law and explained that this expungement provision had eroded over the years and that under state law, it did not erase a conviction for many purposes. See id. This dissent appears to be the fullest written exploration of supremacy since the early 1960s. See id. It is important to note that
this decision was issued before Congress created the federal definition of conviction in the Immigration and Nationality Act in the Illegal Immigration Reform
and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996. See supra note 101 and accompanying
text.
192. Int. Dec. 3364 (BIA 1998).
193. See id.
194. Int. Dec. 3377 (BIA 1999).
195. Int. Dec. 3267 (BIA 1996).

196.

Matter of Roldan, Int. Dec. 3377 at 21.
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consequence for his misconduct, that of deportation from
this country; whereas a citizen accorded similar rehabilitative treatment after the same misconduct may be able to
avoid any further consequences of his conviction. However, section 101 (a) (48) of the Act does not impose a
more severe standard of conduct on aliens than is imposed on citizens of our country. The conduct this respondent has admitted would be a violation of the controlled substance statute for aliens and citizens alike. An
alien is subject to additional consequences as a result of
this misconduct. However, the different treatment of aliens seeking the hospitality of our country is precisely the
subject of the body of laws codified in the Immigration
and Nationality Act. 197
However, the BIA did not, in Matter of Roldan, address vacations of convictions or rehabilitative statutes operating to vacate a
conviction on its merits or for grounds relating to a violation of a
statutory or constitutional right in the underlying criminal proceeding.
What about vacations of convictions entered to assist a noncitizen to avoid deportation? The Board has not yet addressed this
issue since the 1996 definition of conviction. To be consistent,
however, the BIA should not recognize these vacations of convictions. Otherwise, the non-citizen who was initially granted the
benefit of a state rehabilitative statute will be considered convicted,
while the non-citizen who was not, but later succeeded in vacating
the conviction to avoid deportation, will not be considered convicted. This is plainly untenable, aside from the supremacy and
preemption issues.
What lessons are learned from this historical review of Department ofJustice administrative opinions? It is apparent that the
Department of Justice recognizes federal supremacy of immigration law. When the Immigration and Nationality Act specifically
recognized a role for the states and specifically prescribed their actions in the context of judicial recommendations against deportation, the Department of Justice did not recognize post-conviction
actions taken by states to avoid federal law. However, outside of the
judicial recommendation against deportation area, the Department
of Justice has been unsure of where to draw the line between ap197.

Id. at 19-20.
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propriate state action regarding convictions and the supremacy of
federal law, which was, at the time of virtually all of these decisions,
more dependent upon state law. On the one hand, the Department of Justice held that state action taken solely to defeat immigration law is not acceptable. On the other hand, the Department
of Justice has been hesitant to find that states had acted solely to
defeat federal law.
Additionally, BIA decisions do not consistently or adequately
address or analyze this issue. In several decisions, the BIA merely
examines the authority of the state court to act under state law
without proceeding on to the issues of supremacy and preemption.
Also, during these years, Congress had not yet acted to express its
clear intent and purposes regarding convictions under the Immigration and Nationality Act. Therefore, the Department of Justice
was left to its own devices without congressional "signposts." 98

The legal landscape in 1999 is vastly different from when the
Department of Justice was previously examining the supremacy of
federal immigration law in regard to state actions taken to defeat it.
The congressional "signposts" found lacking in 1961 are now
posted and clearly marked. The United States Supreme Court has
set forth a clear preemption test. Federal law regarding convictions
for immigration purposes and the treatment of criminal aliens is
well developed and does not depend upon the vagaries of state law,
as in the past. The time has come for the Attorney General to
thoroughly address the supremacy issue and preserve federal immigration authority as the BIA has begun to do after Congress federally defined "conviction." Otherwise, immigration enforcement
is left to uncontrolled state court judges who operate outside and
in disregard of federal immigration law. Legitimate state police
powers simply do not authorize such action.
V. MINNESOTA CRIMINALJUSTICE

Aside from the federal preemption and equal protection concerns involved in state court vacations of convictions to prevent a
non-citizen's deportation, two main state issues arise. First, these
court orders now appear to disregard Minnesota Supreme Court
precedent. Second, these court orders appear to be inconsistent
with uniform and non-discriminatory treatment of criminal defendants.
198.

See Matter of G-, 9 I. & N. Dec. at 169.
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Minnesota Supreme CourtPrecedent

Minnesota law allows a criminal defendant, after sentencing, to
move the criminal court to withdraw a guilty plea and have the
conviction vacated if necessary to correct a manifest injustice. Accordingly, Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 15.05 states:
Subd. 1. To Correct Manifest Injustice. The court shall
allow a defendant to withdraw a plea of guilty upon a
timely motion and proof to the satisfaction of the court
that withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice.
Such a motion is not barred solely because it is made after
sentence. If a defendant is allowed to withdraw a plea after sentence, the court shall set aside the judgment and
the plea.
Subd. 2. Before Sentence. In its discretion the court may
also allow the defendant to withdraw a plea at any time
before sentence if it is fair and just to do so, giving due
consideration to the reasons advanced by the defendant
in support of the motion and any prejudice the granting
of the motion would cause the prosecution by reason of
actions taken in reliance upon the defendant's plea.
Subd. 3. Withdrawal of Guilty Plea Without Asserting Innocence. The defendant may move to withdraw a plea of
guilty without an assertion of not guilty of the charge to
which the plea was entered.19
These decisions are left to thc sound ldiscretion of die court.
However, as the statute provides, a "manifest injustice" must exist
for withdrawal of a guilty plea after sentencing. °° It is only before
199. MINN. R. CRIM. P. 15.05, subds. 1-3.
200. See Chapman v. State, 282 Minn. 13, 16-17, 162 N.W.2d 698, 700-01
(1968). The Minnesota Supreme Court has determined that:
[A] judgment of conviction based upon a plea of guilty should not be vacated without the strongest of reasons if the effect of such vacation will be
to seriously prejudice or bar proceedings by the state due to changes in
evidentiary circumstances occurring between the time the plea of guilty
was accepted and the time when the case will be tried on the merits if the
judgment of conviction is, in fact, vacated and the plea of guilty annulled.
A plea of guilty cannot be used as a tactical device to frustrate the prosecution ...

. Subject to these restraining considerations, we have fre-

quently held in effect that an application to withdraw a plea of guilty is
addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court and should be
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sentencing when a court may allow withdrawal of a guilty plea when
it is "fair and just" to do so.201
The Minnesota Supreme Court has issued three decisions in
which it clearly states that there is no "manifest injustice" warranting post-conviction withdrawal of a guilty plea and vacation of conviction because of immigration-related reasons.2 0 2 In these decisions, the Minnesota Supreme Court addressed three immigrationrelated situations that do not constitute manifest injustices warranting post-conviction relief. First, federal immigration consequences
are collateral, not direct, consequences of
of criminal convictions
S • 205
Therefore, guilty pleas made in ignorance of
the convictions.
possible federal immigration consequences are still knowing, voluntary and intelligent.2 04 Second, because federal immigration
consequences are collateral to a conviction, there is no duty for a
criminal defense attorney to inform the defendant of federal immigration law.2 °5 Because no duty exists, there is no ineffective assistance of counsel in the absence of this advice. 6 Third, the Mingranted whenever necessary to correct a manifest injustice ....We have
refused to order vacation of a plea of guilty when manifest injustice has
not been demonstrated.
Id. at 700-03 (citations omitted). Under Minnesota law, manifest injustices exist
when:
(1) the court lacked jurisdiction to enter the order;
(2) the defendant did not have the proper mental capacity to plead
guilty;
(3) the prosecution did not fulfill an agreement which induced the plea;
(4) the defendant did not understand the nature and elements of the
charged offense and the consequence of the plea;
(5) the defendant had a "clear and grave" misunderstanding of the admissibility of illegally obtained evidence; and
(6) the defendant made statements at the time of the plea which were inconsistent with the plea and negated an essential element of the crime.
Id. at 702-03.
201. See id. at 703.
202. See Alanis v. State, 583 N.W.2d 573, 575-76 (Minn. 1998); Barragan v.
State, 583 N.W.2d 571, 572-73 (Minn. 1998); Berkow v. State, 583 N.W.2d 562, 56364 (Minn. 1998).
203. See Alanis, 583 N.W.2d at 575-76; Barragan,583 N.W.2d at 572-73; Berkow,
583 N.W.2d at 563-64.
204. See Alanis, 583 N.W.2d at 575-76; Barragan,583 N.W.2d at 572-73; Berkow,
583 N.W.2d at 563-64.
205. See Alanis, 583 N.W.2d at 575-76; Barragan,583 N.W.2d at 572-73; Berkow,
583 N.W.2d at 563-64.
206. See Alanis, 583 N.W.2d at 575-76; Barragan,583 N.W.2d at 572-73; Berkow,
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nesota Supreme Court held that deportation alone is not a manifest injustice warranting post-conviction relief in a state criminal
proceeding. 207
Since the Minnesota Supreme Court has ruled that none of
these immigration-related reasons are a "manifest injustice", and
since a "manifest injustice" is required for withdrawing a guilty plea
and vacating a conviction after sentencing, there appears to be no
discretion left for the trial courts to find that these situations constitute a "manifest injustice." Therefore, courts may no longer find
that these immigration-related reasons constitute a manifest injustice warranting post-conviction relief. Orders granting postconviction relief for immigration-related reasons are in apparent
disregard of and in direct conflict with Minnesota Supreme Court
case law.
B.

Uniform Treatment of Minnesota CriminalDefendants

Fundamentally, the State of Minnesota tries to be fair and nondiscriminatory in its treatment of criminals. This goal is stated in
the rules of criminal procedure 208 and in the sentencing guide583 N.W.2d at 563-64.
207. See Alanis, 583 N.W.2d at 575-76; Barragan, 583 N.W.2d at 572-73; Berkow,
583 N.W.2d at 563-64.
208. See MINN. R. CRIM. P. 1.02. That rule reads:
Purpose and Construction:
These rules are intended to provide for the just, speedy determination of
criminal proceedings without the purpose or effect of discrimination

based upon race, color, creed, religion, national origin, sex, marital
status, status with regard to public assistance, disability, handicap in
communication, sexual orientation, or age. They shall be construed to
secure simplicity in procedure, fairness in administration, and the elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay.
Id. According to recently adopted comments on Rule 1:
It is further the express purpose of these rules that they be applied without discrimination based upon the factors stated in Rule 1.02. The factors are the same as those set forth in Chapter 363 of the Minnesota Statutes forbidding discriminatory practices in employment and certain
other situations except that those handicapped in communication are
added to the list of those protected against discrimination. Minn. Stat. §§
611.31-611.34 (1992). The Minnesota Supreme Court Task Forces on
Gender Fairness and Racial Bias have studied and documented gender
and racial bias in the legal system. Their reports issued June 30, 1989
and May, 1993 respectively contain recommendations to address these
problems. See 15 Win. Mitchell L. Rev. 827 (1989) (gender fairness re-
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lines. 2' Essentially, the guidelines presume sentences for crimes
and list factors that may and may not be considered in departing
from the presumptive sentence.2
The goals of these guidelines are to have uniform punishment
for the same criminal behavior, not to base the punishment on certain characteristics of the criminal or to discriminate unfairly
against certain defendants. 21 Therefore, sentencing decisions are
not to be made because of a person's race, sex, occupation, impact
of sentencing on a profession or occupation, employment history,

port) and 16 Hamline L. Rev. 477 (1993) (racial bias report). Any recommendations in those reports concerning the Rules of Criminal Procedure have been reviewed carefully and appropriate revisions have been
made in these rules.
MINN.

R. CRIM. P. 1.04 cmt. Rule 1 (1999).

209.

SENTENCING
GUIDEUNES COMMISSION,
SENTENCING
See MINNESOTA
PRACTICES: HIGHLIGHTS AND STATISTICAL TABLES FELONY OFFENDERS SENTENCED IN

1993 1 (Feb. 1995).
The stated goals of the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines are:
(1) To promote uniformity in sentencing so that offenders who are convicted of similar types of crimes and have similar types of criminal records
are similarly sentenced;
(2) To establish proportionality in sentencing by emphasizing a "just deserts" philosophy. Those offenders who are convicted of serious violent
offenses (even with no prior record), those who have repeat violent records, and those who have more extensive nonviolent criminal records are
recommended the most severe penalties under the guidelines;
(3) To provide truth and certainty in sentencing;
(4) To enable the legislature to coordinate sentencing practices with correctional resources; and
(5) To better assure public safety.
Id.; see also MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND COMMENTARY § I (1998), providing that:
The purpose of the sentencing guidelines is to establish rational and consistent sentencing standards which reduce sentencing disparity and ensure that sanctions following conviction of a felony are proportional to
the severity of the offense of conviction and the extent of the offender's
criminal history. Equity in sentencing requires (a) that convicted felons
similar with respect to relevant sentencing criteria ought to receive similar sanctions, and (b) that convicted felons substantially different from a
typical case with respect to relevant criteria ought to receive different
sanction.
Id.
210.
211.

Seeid. at 2-37.
See MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND COMMENTARY § II.D (1998).
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employment at the time of the offense or sentencing, educational
background, living arrangements, length of residence or marital
status."'
While citizenship status is nowhere listed in the Minnesota
Rules of Criminal Procedure 213 or Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines, the Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure do apply without
regard to national origin. National origin generally refers to the
country from which someone or someone's ancestors came without
regard to present citizenship. 4 Yet is not citizenship a factor much
like those listed which do not justify departures, e.g., national origin, race, sex, length of residence? Citizenship has nothing to do
with the criminal behavior. Rather it is a fundamental characteristic of the offender, much like national origin, race, sex and length
of residence. Given that most United States citizens cannot realistically change their citizenship, this characteristic is so fundamental
that it is indistinguishable from the characteristics that our state has
declared should not be determinative of sentencing.
As the comments to the sentencing guidelines acknowledge, it
is impossible to reward people possessing a factor without penalizing those without that factor.2 15

If we reward non-citizens with

lighter sentences to help them avoid deportation, then we penalize
United States citizens who do not face deportation. The same
criminal behavior results in different state punishment only be212. See id. § II.D(1)(a)-(d).
213. Immigration warnings have been recently added to the criminal plea procedures. See infra notes 235-236 and accompanying text.
214. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1025 (6th ed. 1990).
215. See MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND COMMENTARY § II.D cmt. 101:
The Commission believes that sentencing should be neutral with respect
to offenders' race, sex, and income levels. Accordingly, the Commission
has listed several factors which should not be used as reasons for departure from the presumptive sentence, because these factors are highly correlated with sex, race, or income levels. Employment is excluded as a
reason for departure not only because of its correlation with race and income levels, but also because this factor is manipulable-offenders could
lessen the severity of the sentence by obtaining employment between arrest and sentencing. While it may be desirable for offenders to obtain
employment between arrest and sentencing, some groups (those with low
income levels, low education levels, and racial minorities generally) find
it more difficult to obtain employment than others. It is impossible to reward those employed without, infact, penalizing those not employed at time of sentencing.
Id. (emphasis added).
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cause of one fundamental characteristic difference of the offender,
i.e., one criminal is not a United States citizen and the other is a
citizen. This clearly contradicts the stated purpose of the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines to have uniform punishment for the
same criminal behavior. Moreover, as we explored earlier in this
article, it is the federal government, not the state government, that
determines whether a non-citizen should be deported. The state
has no legitimate interest in preventing a non-citizen's deportation,
nor in levying or maintaining harsher criminal penalties against
United States citizens.
C. Minnesota Rules of CriminalProcedure
Although citizenship has not previously been addressed in the
Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure, this has recently changed.
Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 15.01, Acceptance of Plea;
Questioning Defendant; Felony and Gross Misdemeanor Cases, sets
forth questioning which the court must make before accepting a
plea of guilty. 16 The defendant is questioned on many issues in-

volved in the criminal proceeding, including: the legal and factual
nature of the charges, whether the defendant was fully advised by
counsel, the right to ajury trial, the presumption of innocence, the
procedures of a criminal trial and waivers of these rights and procedures, the sentences which must and may be imposed, the defendant's guilt or innocence, the defendant's mental
condition,
2 17
and any promises or threats made to the defendant.
Failing to understand the nature and consequences of the plea
has been generally limited to the direct consequences of the plea in
the criminal proceeding. For instance, failing to understand the
nature or seriousness of the charge21 or defendant's legal position
and constitutional rights under the facts and law applicable to the
case.219 Nowhere in this questioning have issues related to collateral
consequences of a conviction been included.
216. See MINN. R_ CRiM. P. 15.01.
217. See id.
218. See State v. Jones, 267 Minn. 421, 427, 127 N.W.2d 153, 157 (1964) (holding defendant's testimony at the time of the plea did not reflect guilt of the
charged crime); see also State v. Bohall, 280 Minn. 1, 2, 157 N.W.2d 845, 846
(1968) (finding that defendant had adequate mental capacity to understand the
essential elements of the crime and consequences of the plea); State v. Hamilton,
280 Minn. 21, 22, 157 N.W.2d 528, 529 (1968) (holding that defendant questioned
extensively and thoroughly at time of plea understood his plea).
219. See State v. Roberts, 279 Minn. 319, 321, 156 N.W.2d 760, 762 (1968).
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Collateral consequences of a conviction, both state and federal, are numerous. The type of consequences and their length
depend upon the number and nature of the convictions. For example to name just a few collateral consequences, convictions may
result in disqualification from: voting,220 holding office, 2' removal
223
2 2
from certain elected offices, 2 public and private employment,
reemployment benefits, 2 4 credit, 22 small corporate offering registraion,' 26 game licensing, commercial or non-commercial driving

28229
licensing,2 8 ability
to drive a school bus, possessing firearms, 230
23123
public assistance, 1 retail liquor licensing,2 2 affiliation with or licensing by the departments of human services and health licensees
(foster care, home care, etc.) 233 and the right to travel abroad.234
Despite all of these collateral consequences, and others that
are not listed in this article, the rules of criminal procedure have
recently been amended to include only one warning of one collateral consequence. This warning is for non-citizens that their plea
may have collateral immigration consequences. Specifically, the
Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure provide that, effective to all
criminal actions commenced or arrests made after 12:00 a.m. on
January 1, 1999, before a court can accept a plea of guilty, the court
must question the defendant:

10. Whether defense counsel has told the defendant and
220. See MINN. CONST. art. VII, § 1.
221.
See MINN. CONST. art. VII, § 6.
222. See MINN. CONsT. art. VIII, § 2.
223. See MINN. STAT. § 147.091 (1998) (physicians); MINN. STAT. § 156.081
(1998) (veterinarians); MINN. STAT. § 326.336 (1998) (employees of private detectives and protective agent license holders); Kim v. State, 434 N.W.2d 263 (Minn.

1989) (private employment).
224. See MINN. STAT. § 268.095, subd. 4 (1998).
225. See A.B. & S. Auto Serv., Inc. v. South Shore Bank, 962 F. Supp. 1056
(N.D. Ill. 1997) (holding no unlawful discrimination under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act for consideration of arrest record). Moreover, the Small Business
Administration regulations require consideration of criminal records in connection with their loans. See id. at 1057.
226. See MINN. STAT. § 80A.115, subd. 3 (a)(2) (1998).
227. See MINN. STAT. § 97A.421 (1998).
228. SeeMINN. STAT. §§ 171.165, 171.17, 171.171-174, 171.18 (1998).
229. See MINN. STAT. §§ 171.321, 171.3215 (1998).
230. See MINN. STAT. § 242.31 (1998).
231. See MINN. STAT. § 256.98, subd. 8 (1998).
232.

See MINN. STAT. § 340A.402 (1998).

233.
234.

See MINN. STAT. § 631.40, subd. 3 (1998); MINN. STAT. § 144A.46 (1998).
See United States v. Banda, 1 F.3d 354, 355-56 (5th Cir. 1993).
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the defendant understands:
c. That if the defendant is not a citizen of the United
States, a plea of guilty to the crime charged may result
in deportation, exclusion from admission to the United
States, or denial of naturalization as a United States
citizen. 35
A similar provision now is also included for misdemeanor
236
cases.
The comment to Rule 15 also is amended to read:
The inquiry required by paragraph 10.c. of Rule 15.01
and by paragraph 2 of rule 15.02 concerning deportation
and related consequences is similar to that required in a
number of other states. See, e.g., California, Cal. Penal
Code § 1016.5; Connecticut, Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 54-1
j; Massachusetts, Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 278, § 29D;
New York, N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 220.50 (7); Ohio, Ohio
Rev. Code Ann. § 2943.031; Oregon, Or. Rev. Stat §
135.385; Texas, Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 26.13;
and Washington, Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 10.40.200. In
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) and the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996), Congress extensively amended the Immigration and Nationality Act and greatly expanded the grounds for deportation
of non-citizens convicted of crimes. Consequently, many
non-citizens pleading guilty to felony charges and even to
a number of non-felony charges will subject themselves to
deportation proceedings. The consequences of such proceedings will often be more severe and more important to
the non-citizen defendant than the consequences of the
criminal proceedings. It is therefore appropriate that defense counsel advise non-citizen defendants of those consequences and that the court inquire to be sure that has
been done.
The requirement of inquiring into deportation and
immigration consequences does not mean that other un235.
236.

MINN. R. CRIM. P. 15.01.
See MINN. R. CRIM. P. 15.02 (amending para. 2).
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anticipated non-criminal consequences of a guilty plea
will justify later withdrawal of that plea. See Kim v. State,
434 N.W.2d 263 (Minn. 1989) (unanticipated employment consequences) .7

The only collateral consequence warning now provided under
Minnesota law does not pertain to all defendants, but only to noncitizen defendants. While immigration consequences are deemed
collateral from the conviction, as are many other consequences,
this one consequence, not affecting United States citizens, is singled out for favorable treatment. The commentary specifically
notes that unanticipated employment consequences do not warrant
a withdrawal of a guilty plea. In other words, United States citizens
must live with all of the unanticipated collateral consequences of
their convictions. Non-citizens do not. And, similar to noncitizens, these collateral consequences may "often be more severe
and more important" to the United States citizen "than the conse237. MINN. R. CRIM. P. 15 cmt. (1998). As to the obligation of defense counsel
in such situations, see ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINALJUSTICE, PLEAS OF GUILTY 143.2 (2d ed. 1982). ABA Standardsfor CriminalJustice 14-3.2 provides:
(a) Defense counsel should conclude a plea agreement only with the
consent of the defendant, and should ensure that the decision whether
to enter a plea of guilty or nolo contendere is ultimately made by the defendant.
(b) To aid the defendant in reaching a decision, defense counsel, after
appropriate investigation, should advise the defendant of the alternatives
available and of considerations deemed important by defense counsel or
the defendant in reaching a decision.
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PLEAS OF GUILTY 14-3.2. The commentary

to this rule states in part:
The standard also recognizes the need for counsel to advise the defendant on other considerations "deemed important by defense counsel or
the defendant." Many collateral consequences may follow conviction,
such as the loss of civil rights, court-martial or disqualification from the
armed services, loss of or ineligibility for licenses granted by the state, use
of the conviction in a subsequent civil case, and even deportation or expatriation. Where from the nature of the case it is apparent that these
consequences may follow (as where the charge concerns defendant's operation of licensed premises) or where the defendant raises a specific
question concerning collateral consequences (as where the defendant
inquires about the possibility of deportation), counsel should fully advise
the defendant of these consequences.
Id. at 14-3.2 cmt. (citations omitted).
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quences of the criminal proceedings., 38 Yet, we do not warn citizens of any collateral consequences of their criminal convictions.
This revision opens the door to many issues. The fundamental
reasons non-citizen criminals usually give to justify a vacation of
their convictions for immigration-related reasons are that they did
not understand the immigration consequences, the federal law has
changed, or that they knew of the consequences but that the application of federal law is a manifest injustice. None of these reasons
pertains to their guilt or innocence, their misunderstanding of the
criminal process, or their rights in the criminal process. These reasons fundamentally concern federal law, not state law, which are
collateral consequences to the conviction.
Now that this warning is provided, is it contemplated that a
non-citizen receiving erroneous advice of potential immigration
consequences will be allowed to withdraw their guilty plea? Does
this mean that if federal immigration laws change, a non-citizen will
be able to seek withdrawal of a guilty plea? The collateral consequences of convictions for United States citizens may also change
over time since they entered a plea of guilty to a crime. United
States citizens, however, are not even warned of all of the collateral
consequences of their convictions and cannot change their plea
because of changed collateral consequences. Regarding all of
these other collateral consequences, non-citizen defendants also
are not warned nor can they change their plea because of them.
Yet, Minnesota now has selected one collateral consequence, federal immigration law, as deserving of a warning. The application
and scope of this new provision must be addressed. It appears,
however, to give unwarranted favorable treatment to one group of
criminal defendants based upon a reason that is not a legitimate
concern for a state.
Finally, we must also realize that when a conviction is vacated,
it is not considered a part of the defendant's criminal history when
being sentenced for a future crime. Once again, the United States
citizen lives with the crime but non-citizens who win vacations of
convictions do not. 39

238.
239.

MINN. R. CRiM. P. 15 cmt. (1998).
See MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND COMMENTARY § II.B (1998).
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VI. CONCLUSION

Minnesota criminal justice should operate without regard to
citizenship status. Whether a non-citizen incurs immigration consequences because of their criminal activities and convictions is a
concern for the federal, not state, government. Disagreements
with federal immigration law should be addressed to federal congressional representatives who enacted the immigration laws. State
laws should not be used by individuals who disagree with federal
law to intentionally contravene the will of Congress. United States
citizens should not receive harsher criminal penalties or live with a
conviction on their record when non-citizens, by virtue of playing
the federal system against the state system, do not. These actions
run afoul of the Supremacy and Equal Protection Clauses of the
United States Constitution. They also run afoul of the Minnesota
goals of uniform treatment of criminals. In a nutshell, this type of
state action should not be done and should not be recognized by
federal law.
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